Baghdad Talks
22/05/2012

• USA and IAEA put positive gloss on upcoming talks.
• Iran won’t abandon its right to enrich uranium.
• The most likely deal is a trade-off between easing of sanctions and lowering uranium enrichment (accompanied by tougher IAEA inspections).
The P5+1 would allow enrichment

18-19/05/2012

DebkaFile claims to have come across an 8-point draft of the agreement to be proposed to Iran. Accordingly, Iran would be allowed to enrich uranium below the 20% threshold and keep all facilities open, and sanctions would be lifted; it would have to sign the Additional Protocol of the Non Proliferation Treaty and move the stockpiled uranium out of Iran [Read]. Los Angeles Times reports almost the same deal, but also mentions the stopping of production in the underground Fordow nuclear facilities [Read].

Every Iranian concession is likely to test the unity of the P5+1: the Iranian gamble is to "split the six". A European diplomat agrees with this: how to react to an Iranian step could be divisive [Read].

The Parchin file

12-14/16/05/2012

An "IAEA country (...) critical of Iran" leaked intelligence about Iran's Parchin military base regarding the supposed weaponization programme being carried out there [Read]. Parchin is not part of Iran's nuclear facilities but the IAEA has repeatedly demanded access to it. Iran "had implicitly been using the IAEA's desire for the Parchin visit as a bargaining chip in negotiations" [Read]. According to Mark Hibbs, "it can be expected that any comprehensive settlement will therefore require Iran to implement the [IAEA's] Additional Protocol", which would make Parchin and other non-nuclear facilities available to the international watchdog [Read]. The Parchin file is one of the most critical, divisive and disputed of the issues in the talks.

France pushes for a softer position

14-16/05/2012

France’s “Hollande administration is much closer to the US and British positions: it is willing to accept an extended process which could lead the international community to accept limited, and strictly monitored, Iranian uranium enrichment” [Read]. In this regard, the former French Prime Minister’s visit to Tehran, during which he met with the Iranian Foreign Minister and the nuclear negotiator, is seen as a strong signal that Hollande’s government is trying to soften the European position [Read].

Israel says it will only accept a total halt

18-19/05/2012

Israel’s Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu strongly clarified what is needed to get Israel to approve the outcome of the Baghdad Talks: 1) freeze all enrichment inside Iran 2) remove all enriched material outside of Iran and 3) dismantle Qom [referring to the Fordow uranium enrichment facility] [Read]. However, DebkaFiles claims that, secretly, Israel has approved the 8-point agreement of the P5+1 [Read].
**Iran’s red lines**

**15/05/2012**
Supreme Leader Khamenei has historically suffered from a lack of charisma and legitimacy. “For Khamenei, nuclear capability is not a goal but rather a means to force the West and its regional allies to recognize the regime’s strategic interests” and, secondarily, its own role in the Iranian political scene. So, Mehdi Khalaji argues, “a guarantee that the West (...) is not seeking the overthrow of Iran’s leaders would have to be a key component of a nuclear compromise” [Read].

**11/05/2012**
Two former Iranian nuclear negotiators identify two Iranian “red lines”: “Tehran may be open to taking a patient approach on sanctions so long as 1) oil and the central bank are off the list and 2) Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment for peaceful purposes is respected” [Read].

**14/05/2012**
Establishing the legitimacy of uranium enrichment is one of the main goals of Iran and the reason behind the past Iranian tactic of “buying time”. By developing the nuclear programme under sanctions, Iran shaped the terms of the discussion: from negotiating the very existence of the programme to negotiating the level of enrichment and inspections. This Iranian ‘victory’, however, could help all sides claim that they won and help defuse the crisis. [Read].

**Russia - USA relations strained**

**21/05/2012**
Russia remains the most unwilling ally of the P5+1 because of its strained relation with the USA. Although Russian relations with Iran are cold and Moscow is increasingly seeing a nuclear Iran as a threat, it is also very skeptical about following the lead of the USA. The 2011 Libya war is still seen by the Russians as an American deceit. [Read]

**Additional Reading**

**Institute for Science and International Security**
*Opening the Door to a Solution with Iran* [Read]

**Oxford Research Group**
*Iran’s Nuclear Impasse – Breaking the Deadlock* [Read]

**Pew Global Attitudes Project**
*A Global “No” To a Nuclear-Armed Iran* [Read]