CITpax INITIATIVE ON PEACEBUILDING AND GOVERNANCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Madrid – 7 February 2007

Seville - 8 February 2007

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With the support of
As new international actors take over reconstruction and reform tasks in Afghanistan, increasing therefore the complexity of the reality on the ground and at the policy planning level, the question of coordination of actors has become ever more critical for the success of peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. This is particularly true in the cases of security sector, judicial and administration reform, which are traditionally interconnected and require not only a coordinated and complementary approach at the conceptual and policy levels but also and above all, among the different international actors engaged in reform processes, both in the provinces and in the Ministries in Kabul.

A year after the adoption of the Afghanistan Compact in the London Conference, CITpax believed that the time was ripe to analyse peacebuilding issues in Afghanistan. It was also the moment to promote a better coordination and an enhanced integrated approach amongst the various international actors, that would best suit the needs of the Afghan people and guarantee the effectiveness of most needed reforms whilst being faithful to the parameters set in the Compact. Finally, the initiative aimed at fostering the deployment of international crisis management new civilian means for the consolidation of peace in Afghanistan.

On 7th February 2007, CITpax gathered in Madrid high level representatives from the major international contributors to the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. This included among others, representatives from the UN, the EU (Council and Commission), the Spanish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior, think tank representatives and international experts, as well as current and former Afghan officials. Experts and representatives discussed during a full working day, exchanging ideas and making proposals on the most pressing topics in the Afghan reconstruction agenda. The round table took place at the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies on Chatham House rules.

On 8th February, the conclusions of the previous workshop were distributed in Seville to 100 university students from various colleges from the South of Spain, including the Universities of Seville and Huelva and the Diplomatic School, who discussed the document and produced a set of questions. These were put forward to the Spanish Minister of Defence and the Secretary General of NATO during a working lunch with the students, held that same day at the Fundación Tres Culturas in Seville.

The current document includes the conclusions of the technical seminar along with the proceedings of the debates, the programme of the different sessions and the list of participants.

We would like to take the opportunity to thank all participants and sponsors whose support and contribution made this meetings possible.

Emilio Cassinello
Director General, CITpax

Luis Peral
Director, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, CITpax
There is consensus among key actors, including GoA, NATO, EU and the UN, and reflected in the voices of the Afghan population, that governance and rule of law- the existence of credible Afghan institutions – is the key to the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan. The overwhelming demand of the Afghan population is for security and rule of law.

Afghan ownership and leadership of the process is crucial. Externally-driven reform and parallel structures can undermine efforts. The sooner that functions are exercised by the Government, the more quickly Afghanistan will become stable and viable.

It is now clear that processes must be framed in a long-term time perspective, and short, medium and long term activities linked to each other. Institution-building by definition can only take place over a number of years.

The renewed engagement of NATO, EU and the UN in support of Afghanistan’s rule of law and governance processes is welcome. These organizations must work through, with and on the Afghan Government. Through – by using Afghan financing channels and institutions- particularly the budget and programs. With – in a partnership where responsibilities are clearly demarcated but there is joint responsibility for the results. On-by recognizing that government institutions are not yet fully functional, and that where government action is not yet aligned to the standards of the international community and the expectations of the Afghan citizens, that a number of mechanisms, including capacity-building, holding the Government accountable to certain standards may be necessary.

Military presence will be necessary in areas of insecurity and weak government capacity. It is of utmost importance that this military action is carried out carefully so as not to undermine the support for the international presence. While troop commitments are essential, complementary political, economic and civilian support must also be provided. National caveats should be removed or reduced where possible.

It is necessary to learn from successes and failures of capacity building both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Instead of relying on expensive technical assistance, other mechanisms for knowledge-transfer should be considered. In this respect looking at the modalities of European Union Accession, Neighbourhood and Framework Agreements where monitoring and twinning and exchange programs were used, could be useful. Capacity-building must take a holistic, institutional approach, rather than focus only on training. An education-based approach rather than a training-based approach should be considered.

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1 Shared and commonly agreed by all participants during the conclusion session in the Madrid workshop, 7th February 2007
The role of PRTs should be continuously assessed to ensure its efficiency and effectiveness. Incorporation of civilian components should be considered, whereby contributing states could contribute civilian expertise. Political, economic, and security work should be integrated, aligned to the national strategies and programmes, and made transparent.

There is an opportunity to recalibrate the approaches through which support is provided. Opportunities to find synergies between organizations should be found to ensure coherence in approaches. There is no need for new coordination mechanisms, rather, there is a need for strategic alignment between among international actors, particularly in Brussels.

The missing link is a shared framework for financing and implementation that provides a platform for delivery. Coordination takes place is most successful when through common financing, planning, budgeting and programming frameworks. The critical mechanisms here are the trust funds including ARTF and LOTFA which contain dual key mechanisms and safeguards against corruption including audit reports and release of funds only on a reimbursable basis; the Afghan Government's budget process and national programs.

Parallel financing and project mechanisms risk undermining the overall effort and authority of the state, by diverting precious resources and staff to small-scale initiatives that are not rooted in an overarching partnership with the international community and legal framework, and should be avoided. At the same time, developing the capability of civil society and the private sector is important.

National Programmes have emerged as the best practice for implementation. These bring the international community, Government of Afghanistan and the population into a common framework towards specific objectives. While a number of national programmes have proven effective, more work is needed to strengthen existing programmes and create new ones that bring existing and expanded initiatives into a coherent approach.

In particular:

(1) Rule of Law

A new rule of law program is needed which provides a shared framework for all actors, addresses pay and rank issues, and brings fragmented projects into a common approach. Particularly important is ensuring that donors do not import new laws that are not aligned to the national system; rather, the system of laws must produce alignment between the Constitution, the existing set of laws, and the capacity for implementation. The European Union, UNAMA and other actors must work with the Government to ensure that the new programme is suitably designed. Careful consideration of how the system interacts with Islamic, informal and community mechanisms for dispute resolution should be given.

(2) Public Administration

A coherent Public Administration program is needed for central, provincial and district administration. Given that institutions must function at all levels of governance, this
means simultaneous reform is necessary at Kabul level as well as at local level in provinces, districts and villages and that financial management and administration must be driven internally by the Government in partnership with the International Community. Economic governance and regulation of the private sector is an area that needs significant further work. Finding ways to ensure merit-based recruitment and investment in Afghan human capital is essential not only to make Afghans stakeholders in their future but to ensure fairness of the process.

(3) Police and Army

The Ministries of Interior, Defence, the Intelligence and National Security Council must each be seen individually and collectively as systems. Police training must be part of a holistic and comprehensive strategy for reform of the Ministry of Interior. US and EU efforts must be aligned to a common strategy for reform of the police, administration and Ministry of Interior in general.

Efforts should be made to ensure that the above programs, and others such as DIAG, are integrated with each other. Fiscal sustainability of the security sector must be examined as a long term issue, with support to enhance customs and taxation revenue reinvigorated to ensure that Afghanistan is fiscally sustainable as soon as possible.

Strategies to tackle the narco-economy have not yet yielded the desired results. Further understanding is needed of the inter-linkages between security, politics and economics in Afghanistan, with a focus on the nature and dynamics of criminal and illicit activities including narcotics, smuggling, licensing, land allocations, linkages to governance issues and effect on consent of the population. International organizations are currently constrained by their respective mandates to conduct a comprehensive analysis. A group of experts agreed by key international organizations - including the World Bank, EU, NATO and UN - should be appointed to conduct joint analysis and provide a common diagnostic of the state of the illicit economy and corruption.

There is further opportunity to reinvigorate regional consensus on Afghanistan, with a view to enhancing the political and economic benefits of regional consensus. Effective measures to end the cross-border insurgency are urgently needed.

Citizen and civil society voice is critical for accountability of the Government and the stability of Afghanistan. Ways -including through Parliament- to promote the enfranchisement of Afghans in their country and give them a stake in their future need to be identified. This includes finding ways to communicate the objectives and progress of the Afghanistan Compact and international and governmental activities to the Afghan population.
ON THE CONCEPT OF AFGHAN OWNERSHIP AND POLICY PLANNING

One of the participants stated that since the establishment and consolidation of a legitimate government and parliament, the idea of channelling assistance through the government and working with the government makes admirable sense. The participants agreed that the idea of working with the government, through the government and on the government is therefore paramount. But it was also admitted that the international community has not met the challenge of working, on, through and with the government, to the degree that it really had to.

As one of the participants stated, nothing will be possible in development or in the field of security, in terms of sustaining the hopes of Afghans, unless the international community is able to continue to support the emergence of credible government institutions. There was overwhelming agreement on the idea that there is no substitute to a legitimate, competent and accountable State and its institutions. It was acknowledged that even though there is a need for civil society institutions, market institutions and a prosperous and democratic society, these cannot succeed without legitimate institutions of the State.

Comprehensive and institutional approaches were discussed as cornerstones of any present and future reform strategy. One of the participants stated that the legitimate government’s Strategy and budget, is vital for the coordination of international actors, and key to the institutional approach. Participants also discussed the dangers of channelling assistance through parallel structures as one of the factors that could contribute to the institutional weakness of state institutions.

The international community provides technical support and financial resources, through the institutions. One of the participants stated that parallel security and development institutions, are important but the time has now come, that these functions are assumed by Afghans. This goes along the lines of the afghan ownership concept, but as participants specified, another issue that needs to be very much born in mind, is the question not just of afghan ownership but of afghan civilian ownership, and leadership.

As one of the participants put it, if Afghanistan is to be owned by its own people, as legitimate members of the global community, then anything that happens in Afghanistan will have to be “Afghanised”. This concept of “Afghanisation” was extensively discussed as a synonym of Afghan leadership in the context of the reform processes. Afghanisation encompasses, as discussed in the meeting, both Afghan leadership and Afghan governmental accountability to the people and the international community. Afghanisation as one of the participants put it, should be considered as a new division of labour between the international community and the government of Afghanistan whereby the former works as a partner giving advice, support and demanding accountability and the latter remains legitimate and accountable while formulating and implementing policies.

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2 By Gabriel Reyes Leguen, Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, CItpax
Participants also agreed on the inadequacy of resources currently allocated to the tasks at hand in all sectors. As one participant pointed out, if international players don’t furnish the resources and don’t step away from parallel structures back towards collaboration with the government, the prospects for credible institutions are low. Another proposal involved keeping a smaller but efficient international military force on the ground in order to be able to allocate more resource to Afghan institutions once those institutions are ready to perform their tasks.

There is a renewed consensus that national strategies and national plans, delivered through government owned programmes are extremely effective and that there is room for introducing the idea of national programmes into the justice, police and public administration sectors. As one participant pointed out, national programmes developed in Afghanistan have a top down and a bottom up dimension, and for that very reason are particularly suitable to meet the challenges ahead in the fields discussed during the meeting.

All participants agreed on the urgent need to increase the contribution to the pay grading systems and institutional reform in all sectors. However, the views on the fiscal sustainability of the different proposed solutions were mixed. One of the participants mentioned that LOFTA has failed as a catalyst for administrative and finance reform of the police, calling for a reassessment of this kind of systems. Another participant praised the beneficial effects of the ARTF that has contributed to the payment of the salaries of 220,000 public servants. Unfortunately, Afghanistan is not likely to be fiscally sustainable for the next 10-15 years as one participant expressed, adding that there is a need to focus international contribution on the increase of salaries, maybe at the expense of international military spending.

One of the participants followed up on the need to increase salaries in all sectors, by pointing out that we have recently witnessed a unilateral increase in the ANA salaries that does raise serious fiscal sustainability issues. Police and judicial salaries have not been raised as much as the ANA and this is creating a vicious circle as the ANA salaries are increased once again. This has led to a situation where there is a considerable gap between security sector and other institutions’ salaries. According to the same participant, this situation shows the need to look at the government more holistically and not based on particular projects or programmes.

Participants agreed that there is a need to move from training to education and that in-service training is a key concept. But it was also acknowledged that this task will take years. As it was stated during the debate, strategically, a country cannot live on the training of existing staff, it will have to create a new generation of administrators, judges, police officers… The focus should therefore be on education instead of training.

One of the lessons learned mentioned during the debate is that rebuilding institutions in Afghanistan cannot be done in a piecemeal fashion and that an “Afghanised” institutional approach needs to be implemented. An institution will therefore have to be considered in its totality –whether at local or central level.
ON THE MILITARY vs. CIVILIAN APPROACH TO THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

All participants agreed that the solution to Afghanistan will not be solely military. While it was agreed that putting the emphasis on military planning from day one is not the best way to deal with crises, one of the participants stated, the solution proposed by the Bonn Agreement was not military from the start. A global planning is therefore needed as a military solution will not be enough in the building of a solid state. While it was agreed that there is no development without security and no security without development, one participant stated that the best way to assist Afghanistan is through strengthening of the government and its institutions. As it was mentioned, heavy military presence, although necessary, can’t be sustained in terms of public opinion for too many years -maybe a maximum of 2- unless this military presence begins to produce very clear results. Finally, one of the participants noted that we are currently at a turning point from a military perspective to a civilian approach leading to a greater emphasis on the civilian side while not letting down military planning.

The question of distribution of tasks on the ground was also discussed in detail. One of the participants mentioned that military strategy does not stem directly from the military; it is decided by governments that use military means. The military has the capacity to adapt to the needs of its government and society as one of the participants stated. When addressing military strategy, the issue of the military assuming tasks that are not really theirs is usually raised. One of the participants pointed out that far too often tasks are undertaken by actors not having the necessary means. There is a lack of civilian experts on the ground in the fields of police, justice and local administration that pushes the military to fill in that vacuum. This situation presses for the creation of civilian crisis management capacity that could be deployed on the ground- a view shared by all participants.

ON NATO-ISAF’s ROLE

It was agreed that the current mission in Afghanistan is paramount for the North Atlantic Alliance and that the member states will remain fully engaged. The challenges faced by NATO-ISAF today are greater than they have been at any time, including an insurgency in the south that has led NATO troops to engage for the first time in combat operations. This requires NATO members to keep their public opinions engaged in order to maintain the momentum. The alliance is looking at ways of enhancing capacity of the Afghan national army and police as part of its operations plan as well as enhancing their equipment. This renewed interest in SSR is a result of ISAF’s expansion to the whole of Afghanistan.

The harmonisation of PRT activities remains critical for NATO-ISAF and can partly be achieved through the timely exchange of information. Although some participants praised the work and achievements of PRTs, it was pointed out that they are not necessarily the best platform to deliver civilian engagement. Due to national caveats in PRTs, civilians’ ability to deliver services is sometimes restricted. There is therefore a need to think in terms of national networks to deliver advice and expertise nationally. Participants agreed that NATO’s comprehensive approach has to be implemented and that the political will
exists but there needs to be a follow up and implementation on the ground. One of the participants mentioned that there is a lot of value in trying to harmonise the role of PRTs. These structures should be seen as not only sending information to their capitals, but as information gathering instruments that would help institutions in Kabul, for example in the fight against narcotics and corruption as well as DIAG.

It was also acknowledged that efforts are being made in order to bring nations to politically accept some sort of harmonisation of PRTs. Some countries like Germany have brought some creative ideas such as the creation of the figure of the Civilian Development Adviser responsible for the entire region but more needs to be done to do more.

Finally, it was acknowledged that the alliance seeks working in cooperation with other actors on the ground including the EU, but there needs to be more regular, high level political consultation to achieve cooperation. As one participant noted, PRTs can play a very important role in supporting the local government in terms of coordination with the UN and other actors on the ground. If PRTs go through the channels of local authorities, then there is a very practical way to improve the provincial coordination. In any case, PRTs will also, and above all, have to work with the Afghan government on the ground.

ON THE FUTURE INVOLVEMENT OF THE EU ON THE GROUND

The involvement of the European Union was also discussed, with great emphasis on the future missions of the Council and the Commission on police and justice respectively. It was noted that the EU has funded a variety of programmes since 2001 and contributed bilaterally to the deployment of civilian capabilities through the PRTs. The Commission will concentrate on justice while the Council will focus on the police sector through the deployment of its relatively new mechanism of crisis management in the framework of the ESDP. It was stressed that the existing interdependency between the two sectors will lead to a complementary approach in the reform processes. The Council’s contribution will entail the deployment of a police crisis management mission, in coordination with other actors and continuing the work done by Germany. The EU aspires to go further than coordination and gather under the umbrella of an ESDP mission all bilateral actors in the police sector. The establishment of one chain of command will allow lowering the number of interlocutors for the Afghan government in the police sector to two, namely the EU and the US.

The Council’s future mission was discussed in detail: the mission aims at supporting police reform, contributing to strengthening state authority in provinces and regions the links between justice and police, and coordinating the financial aspects of bilateral efforts. It will be deployed in May/June 2007 and will count with 160 police officers distributed in Kabul (70) and in the provinces and regions (chain of command divided in 5 regions following the military command) and covering 13 PRTs (19 provinces in total).

The Commission increased operational involvement, especially on the budget side, will involve boosting reforms in the justice sector which has been overlooked since 2002. During the debate, the importance of Italy’s work in this field was praised although it was acknowledged that institutional reform issues have not been addressed. The subsequent need to look holistically at the rule of law sector and tackle the issues of basic pay
grading and recruitment systems was therefore raised by some of the participants. The Commission will entertain the idea of providing a trust fund or some kind of budget support to justice salaries as was done in the police sector via the Law and Order Trust Fund. This will add to the ongoing initiatives from the Afghan government and hopefully redress some of the deficiencies of the current system. The idea of introducing a system similar to the ARTF, to design some kind of a national programme, was put forward by one of the participants, although the problem of creating yet another trust fund was also mentioned.

It was also mentioned that the EU’s contribution is very useful because of its experience with accession. The Afghanistan Compact is similar to the EU accession programme as it combines support, tuning and monitoring. One of the participants proposed to look more closely at the lessons learned from this system and its possible application in the Afghan context as it would help finding the right balance of working, with, through and on the government. In this respect, it was stressed that since NATO has de facto opened the Partnership for Peace framework to Afghanistan, the EU could similarly extend instruments and methods of its Neighbourhood Policy and/or its Mediterranean Policy to help developing institutions in Afghanistan. Participants concluded that the only international and thus EU’s exit strategy will be the success of the Afghan government.

ON THE POLICE REFORM AND ITS INTERDEPENDENCY WITH OTHER SECTORS

As one participant mentioned, both overselling the success story and overselling the sense of failure or defeat should be avoided. The situation in Afghanistan should therefore be kept in perspective. During the past years, the expectations of what could be achieved in such a short period of time were highly unrealistic. Some of the issues raised in the meeting are no exceptions. Quick fix solutions should be avoided especially in the case of the police reform. Participants agreed that there are certainly more resources now, but there is an urgent need for a unified police strategy, in contrast with the various existing strategies based on the situations on the ground. However, more resources are needed in all sectors, especially in justice and administrative reform.

There was overwhelming agreement on the idea that without a comprehensive approach to the reform of the ministry of interior, focusing on police reform might be a waste of effort. Police reform should now concentrate on a political as well as on a technical approach.

In order to create a civilian police that promotes the rule of law, work needs to be done to consolidate a functional judicial sector, a criminal investigation system and a prison system. One of the participants warned that until the international community gets serious about reforming the judicial sector the prospect of a functioning civilian police will be in danger.

As for the specific case of justice reform, it was acknowledged that the process was two years behind the police. Participants pointed out that even though there is the political will and the leadership needed to impulse reform, there is no national programme or implementation mechanism to support the vision of the leaders. Another participant
added that the holistic approach in the justice sector reform should be translated into an effort to foster the coherence of the legal framework and avoid the current fragmentation of law that stems from the various national approaches to justice sector reform.

**ON REGIONAL ACTORS**

The part played by Pakistan in the dynamics of Afghanistan’s stability as well as Iran’s contribution to the reconstruction efforts (via funding and rehabilitation of human capital and support to the political system that has emerged in Afghanistan) was discussed. There was no consensus as to how to engage Pakistan, even though all participants agreed that cross border terrorist activity has to stop. Different proposals were put forward ranging from drafting a “Pakistan Compact” that would set benchmarks for putting an end to cross border activity, to a greater political engagement that would also include other actors in the region. The need to think of the political and security impacts of economic partnerships with neighbouring countries was also mentioned. The importance of NATO’s trilateral commission was praised and the need for a consensus on a unified international and regional approach was discussed. As for other international actors Russia’s engagement remains controversial but efforts have been made in order to bind it to the international effort. China has shown interest in the NATO-ISAF engagement in Afghanistan and is maintaining exchanges of information in this regard, strengthening therefore the regional dimension.

**ON COORDINATION AMONG INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT**

**On the need for coordination at the programme level**

The issue of coordination at programme level was also raised. As one participant pointed out, the large numbers of policies proposed and implemented in the past years, focused on the consolidation of what needs to be addressed in Afghanistan in terms of the macro level policy, but there is a lack of coordination at the programme level, and at the delivery mechanism level. This is the case of the lead donor concept, where each donor focuses on its own specific areas, but tends to leave aside synergies.

Participants agreed that there is a need to bring the actors together and share the resources, in order to maximise the investments made. This can only be done by consolidating what has already been achieved through the existing structures. In that sense the good results achieved in the reform of the ANA, can be explained by the fact that reform was undertaken five years ago, partly due to the impulse given by a strong leadership that attracted the donors. Police and judicial reform were left aside, because of weak capacity within the government.

**On coordination strategies:**

All participants agreed that there is no need to create more coordination structures and that more needs to be done to maximise the work of existing structures such as the JCMB and the PAG. One of the examples mentioned was the case of ANDS where, according to one of the participants, there is a need to make the coordinating
and reporting mechanisms a lot more streamlined to avoid spending too much time and effort in procedural tasks. Another participant mentioned the need for a follow up mechanism that would supervise the implementation of the decisions made during the coordination meetings as well as the need for a cross-sectoral mechanism among the different sectors and programmes, for issues such as water. Coordination on counter-narcotics was mentioned as a paradox, where there is excellent coordination but the implementation and sometimes the planning are not there.

As one participant noted with regard to planning, one of the keys to success in the coming years under the Compact will be to try to link the process of elaborating a National Development Strategy owned by Afghans, to the major planning the international community will be facing. There should also be planning that would strategically link administrative reform and capacity building for the public sector, to the NDS and other donors’ plans.

Some participants shared the view that the primary field for coordination has to be the budget and cabinet level discussion – to which the international community is contributing through consultative groups and the working groups under the National Development Strategy. As one participant stated, unless the international community brings coordination at the budget and programme levels, it will be impossible to reach real coordination. It was concluded that the policy coordination exists, but not the programme coordination, and that coordination becomes easier once there is agreement on strategies and policies. The need of a broad international consensus on the general strategy towards Afghanistan was stressed throughout the meeting.

In particular, the idea of a full coordinated approach on military, political, diplomatic and reconstruction dimensions was put forward by one of the participants. This should involve: From the military viewpoint, a boost in DIAG activities, especially in the north, in order to ensure and efficient fight against corruption and drugs, the control of the monopoly of violence by the government and the prosperity of good governance and the rule of law; From the political viewpoint, to push for better governance in the South and in other areas to fight the Taliban and provide alternative models to the Taliban that will appeal to the afghan public; From the diplomatic viewpoint, and as far as Europeans are concerned, to develop a coordinated approach to the region that would include India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran; Finally, from the reconstruction perspective, a much faster approach to reconstruction, with far more labour intensive and quick impact projects, particularly in areas that have been cleared of Taliban.

Finally, one of the participants concluded that coordination needs constant renewal and integration but at the same time it needs to be rationalised and its implementation followed up closely.

**On coordination at the local level:**

As one of the participants pointed out, there is currently a plethora of coordinating bodies in Kabul involving more or less the same principal actors. It appears to the outsider, that these mechanisms are not replicated in any meaningful form at the provincial level where things are done on an ad hoc basis and depend on local security and dynamics.
The need for effective coordination at the provincial level was therefore stressed.

One of the participants pointed out that although there is strategic level coordination at country level and coordination mechanisms between the government and the donors, attention should now shift towards, sub-national level coordination. As it was indicated during the debate, Afghanistan’s sub-national administration has never been designed properly and there is therefore an urgent need to look at the design of the public administration at the sub-national level without falling into a federal state system. Power needs to be devolved to the sub national level, decentralised in the way it has been done through the National Solidarity Programme, and that can only be achieved with the support of the international community.

This idea of the urgent need for provincial coordination was extensively discussed. One of the participants pointed out that provincial reconstruction shows a deficiency in the definition of who is leading planning and coordination. The question of whether these parts are played either by the government or the organisations that have their own sources of funding - and that are setting the agenda as opposed of being subsumed under a national plan – was put forward. Participants also agreed that de-concentration or at least delegation of certain decisions to lower levels as well as de-concentration of spending need to be addressed. The initiative on programme budgeting in a couple of ministries and several provinces should also be considered (as one of the participants put it, unless activities are tied to money it does become a talking shop).

**On coordination and specific actors on the ground:**

It was acknowledged that joint planning among donors has not been as strong as it should have been. All participants agreed that the UN plays a quite active coordinating role in the places where UN is present – not currently as extensively present in the provinces as the PRTs - however, the UN does not have any aspirations to be the coordinators in all the sectors. In some the lead coordinator can be the government, EU or NATO or even the Afghan private sector as one of the participants proposed. In any case, it was made clear that in the long term, the Afghan government will have to take the lead.

As one participant mentioned, coordination between the EU and NATO is good at staff level although this cannot be replaced by coordination at the political level for various reasons. However, coordination will continue between EU and NATO-ISAF, as the latter will provide logistical support for the future EU missions on the ground.
PROGRAMMES

Technical Seminar:
“The Role of the International Community in the Reform of the Police, the Judicial System, and the Local Administrative Sector”

Madrid – 7 February 2007

Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies,
Plaza de la Marina Española, 9, Madrid

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AGENDA

09:00 – 13:00 - Session One: Police, Justice and Administration Reform: Short and Medium Term Prospects

09:00 – 10:30 - First Panel

09:00 - Welcome Remarks

Emilio Cassinello, Director General CITpax
José Álvarez Junco, Director, Centre of Political and Constitutional Studies
Celia Abenza, Director General, Institutional Relations, Ministry of Defence, Spain
Moderator: Emilio Cassinello

Speakers (5 minutes):

*Hanif Atmar*, Minister of Education, Afghanistan  
*Christopher Alexander*, Deputy for Political Affairs of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, UNAMA

10:30 – 11:00 - **Coffee Break**

11:00 – 12:30 - **Second Panel**

Moderator: Emilio Cassinello

Speakers (5 minutes)

*Paul Turner*, Relations with Afghanistan, European Commission  
*Pedro Serrano de Haro*, Director, Civilian Crisis Management, EU Council  
*Mihai Carp*, Deputy Head of the Crisis Management Policy Section, Operations Division, NATO

12:30 – 13:00 **Partial Assessment of Needs and Capacities**

Moderators:  
*Clare Lockhart*, Director, State Effectiveness Initiative  
*Luis Peral*, CItpax

**Main issues to addressed and discussed during this session:**

- Central vs. local approaches: Should the process (including training) stem from a local reform approach to further move to a reform at the central level? How can the actors on the ground contribute to the effective coordination and implementation of reforms within the Ministries in Kabul?
- What are the main challenges specific to each sector reform and the means needed to tackle them?
- How can the civilian and military components of the actors on the ground be complemented in order to contribute more effectively to the various reform processes?
- Are the means currently deployed on the ground sufficient and adequately adapted to support the reforms at the local level? What human resources are currently being invested and what are the foreseen needs in the short (2 years) and medium (5 years) term?
- Are civilian experts working with local counterparts to build local capacities? Is the spirit of the “Afghan Ownership” being preserved?

13:00 – 14:30 – **Lunch**
14:30-17:30 – Session Two: Coordination of the International Actors: Towards a Greater Integrated Approach

14:30 – 15:45 - First Panel

Moderator:
Francesc Vendrell, Special Representative of the EU to Afghanistan

Speakers:

Francesc Vendrell, Special Representative of the EU to Afghanistan
Mihai Carp, Deputy Head of the Crisis Management Policy Section, Operations Division, NATO

15:45 – 16:15 - Coffee Break

16:15 – 17:30 Second Panel

Moderator:
Francesc Vendrell, Special Representative of the EU to Afghanistan

Speakers:

Christopher Alexander, Deputy for Political Affairs of the SRSG for Afghanistan, UNAMA
Hanif Atmar, Minister of Education, Afghanistan

Main issues to be addressed and discussed during this session:

- Have the existing coordination mechanisms at central level, namely the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) and PRT Executive Steering Committee, worked efficiently? Could any other type of coordination mechanism at that level be envisaged in order to better meet the requirements on the ground agreed in the morning session?
- How can coordination both at central and local level be improved? Are local actors included in the equation? To what extent this is contributing to winning the “hearts and minds” of Afghans?
- Since 23 EU Member States have troops deployed in Afghanistan within the NATO/ISAF mission, and in view of the future EU missions on the ground, should the Union’s visibility be increased at the strategic coordination level both in Kabul and the provinces?
- What are the prospects of a change in the civilian-military ratio on the ground? How could it be articulated in order to ensure the efficient work of civilian missions with no military component?

17:30 – 18:30 – Conclusions and Recommendations

Chairpersons:
Clare Lockhart, Director, State Effectiveness Initiative
Luis Peral, CITpax
Afghanistan and the Impact of NATO’s Adaptation to the New Challenges

Seville – 8 February 2007

Fundación Tres Culturas
Pabellón Hassan II, C/Max Planck, 2, Isla de la Cartuja, Sevilla

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11.00 – 12.30 - Preparatory Working Session

Working Session with Students (8 groups of 8 to 10 people)

Clare Lockhart, Director, State Effectiveness Initiative; Adviser, ISAF
Enrique Silvela Díaz-Criado, Technical Cabinet Secretariat General Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence;
Luis Peral, Director, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution Programme, CITpax
Enrique Ojeda, Director Fundación Tres Culturas.

13.00 – 14.30 – Working Lunch with NATO’s Secretary General and the Spanish Ministry of Defence

Introduction: Enrique Ojeda, Director Fundación Tres Culturas.
Shlomo Ben Ami, Vice President of CITpax

Speakers

• Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General
• José Antonio Alonso, Minister of Defence, Spain

Questions submitted by students of the University of Seville
15.00 – 18.30 - High Level Political Forum

15.00 – 15.45 – First Panel

Present and Future of NATO/ ISAF’s Role in Afghanistan: New Means for New Challenges?

Chairman: Emilio Cassinello, Director General CITpax

Speakers

- Bernardo Álvarez del Manzano Albiñana, Commander of Operations Command, Spain
- Jamie Shea, Director, Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO
- Massoom Stanekzai, Former Head of DDR for the Afghan Government and Former Minister of Communications, Afghanistan

15.45 – 16.30 - Open debate with students of the University of Seville

17.00 – 17.45 – Second Panel

The Need for a Comparative Advantages Approach: How can the action of the International Community be coordinated with NATO/ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan?

Chairman: Luis Peral, CITpax

Speakers

- Hanif Atmar, Minister of Education, Afghanistan
- Christopher Alexander, Deputy for Political affairs of the Special Representative, UNAMA
- Francesc Vendrell, EU Special Representative to Afghanistan.

17.45 – 18.30 - Open debate with students of the University of Seville
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Celia Abenza*, Director General for Institutional Relations, Ministry of Defence, Spain

Mohammad Hanif Ahmadzai*, Second Secretary, Embassy of Afghanistan, Brussels

Christopher Alexander*, Deputy for Political Affairs of the Special Representative for the Secretary General for Afghanistan, UNAMA

José Antonio Alonso Suárez, Defence Minister, Spain

Bernardo Álvarez del Manzano Albiñana, Commander of Operations Command, Spain

José Álvarez Junco*, Director, Centre of Political and Constitutional Studies

Hanif Atmar*, Minister of Education, Afghanistan

Peter Babbington*, ex-Director of the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, UNAMA

Mireia Barrachina Pló*, Programme Assistant, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, CITpax

Mercedes Batiste*, Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Spain

Pablo Benavides Orgaz, Spanish Ambassador to NATO

Shlomo Ben-Ami, CITpax Vicepresident

Mihai Carp*, Deputy Head of the Crisis Management Policy Section, Operations Division, NATO

Emilio Cassinello*, Director General, CITpax

Luis Cuesta Civis, Secretary General for Defence Policy

Richard Figueroa*, First Secretary of Culture, Education and Press, US Embassy in Madrid

Paul Fishstein*, Director, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Afghanistan

Jean Fournet, Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, NATO

Vicente Garrido*, Director, Institute of International Affairs and Foreign Policy (INCIPE), Spain

Juan Garrigues*, Desk Officer, Latin America Programme, CITpax
April D. Hahn*, Deputy Director of the elections and political process division. Office of
democracy and governance, USAID

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, General Secretary, NATO

Minna Kukkonen*, Crisis Management Initiative

Vincenzo Lattanzi*, Italian Justice Office Project Manager, Afghanistan

Clare Lockhart*, Director, State Effectiveness Initiative; Adviser, ISAF

José María López Navarro, Information Officer, Public Diplomacy Officer, NATO

Jordi Marsal*, President, Petitions Commission, Spanish Parliament

Claudia Medina*, Director of Projects, CITpax

Aurora Mejía*, Cabinet of the Spanish President

José Antonio Mellado Valverde*, Head of Service, Sub Directorate General of
International Police Cooperation, Security State Secretary, Spain

Pedro Moya, General Secretary, Exterior Action, Regional Government of Andalusia

Aly Nazerali*, European Representative, Aga Khan Development Network

Diego de Ojeda*, Cabinet of the Spanish President

Enrique Ojeda, Director, Fundación Tres Culturas

Javier Parrondo*, Spanish Embassy in Afghanistan

Luis Peral*, Director, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, CITpax

Gabriel Reyes Leguen*, Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme
CITpax

Michael Richtsteig, Consul General, German Embassy, Seville

Jaime Rodríguez-Toubes*, Admiral, Director, Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies,
Ministry of Defence, Spain

Félix Sanz Roldán, Chief of Staff for Defence
Pedro Serrano de Haro*, Director, DG E IX, Civilian Crisis Management, EU Council

Henne Schuwer, Ambassador, Director of the Private Office, NATO

Enrique Silvela Díaz-Criado*, Technical Cabinet Secretariat General Defence Policy,
Ministry of Defence
Massoom Stanekzai*, Former Head of DDR for the Afghan Government and Former Minister of Communications, Afghanistan

Mohammad Suleman Kakar*, Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, Afghanistan

Paul Turner*, Relations with Afghanistan, European Commission

Jamie Shea, Director, Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO

Francesc Vendrell*, Special Representative of the EU to Afghanistan

Andrew Wilder*, Research Director, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, USA

100 University students and 17 professors: University of Seville, University Pablo de Olavide, University of Huelva; Diplomatic School (Madrid), International University of Seville.

* Participants attending the Madrid technical seminar on 7 February 2007
The Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) seeks to contribute to the prevention and resolution of violent or potentially violent international or intra-national conflicts and to the consolidation of peace, within a framework of respect and promotion of Human Rights and democratic values. Thus, the CITpax contributes to the establishment of cooperation pathways and communication channels between the parties involved, governments, NGO’s and representatives of all sectors in the civil society.

**ACTION PATHWAYS**

In order to achieve its objectives, the CITpax employs various tools specially designed for each particular situation, including the following:

- **Second Track Diplomacy**, through the direct facilitation in negotiation processes between relevant political and economic actors, in conflicts where a dialogue pathway becomes necessary to complement or break the deadlock in the official track.

- **Multi-Track Diplomacy and Dialogue Facilitation**, through the creation of dialogue platforms among scholars, experts, activists, local authorities and governing bodies, as well as assisting the development of peace-building capacities in conflict areas.

- **Field Projects**, aimed at improving the capacities for conflict prevention and resolution through confidence-building, research and advocacy of feasible peace policies.

- **Research and Policy Development** of peace-related issues.

- **Professional Development and Training**, seeking to enhance the capacities of practitioners from different institutions working on peace-related issues.

- **Public Awareness and Advocacy**, through information dissemination, policy-oriented publishing and participation in the public debate.

**PROGRAMMES**

Notwithstanding a progressive extension of its working field to other areas, such as Southeast Europe, the CITpax current activities and projects are divided into three main programmes: two geographical programmes, one centred on Africa and the Middle East, and the other on Latin America, and the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, which thematically complements and supports the regional programmes.

**Africa and the Middle East**

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, CITpax is exploring Track II diplomatic tools to enhance ongoing negotiations and the status of the peace process. The Programme also intends to progressively address some of the core challenges of the region, such as the conditions for the establishment of a cooperation and security system in the Middle East. Addressing regional conflicts, discreet efforts are being made to bring regional parties to explore venues for strengthening local peaceful resolutions. Focusing on the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and the enhancement of civil society in several countries in the Middle East, such as Syria and Lebanon. CITpax is also engaged in the North Africa context, with an emphasis on the Western Sahara conflict and the future of economic integration in the Maghreb. Lastly, the programme is engaged in exploring conflict management tools related to natural resources such as water and oil.

**Areas of Activity:**

- Regional Stability in the Middle East
- Emphasis on the Palestinian Israeli conflict
- Economic Integration of the Maghreb
- Transition to democracy
Latin America

The programme has the following fields of activity: (1) in Colombia, CITpax facilitates dialogue between various groups on key issues emanating from the armed conflict and promotes the consolidation of institutions and mechanisms relevant to the pursuit of peace; (2) in the Andean region, it undertakes initiatives of a subregional scope to deepen the understanding of, and promote respect for, political, cultural and ethnic diversity and to foster confidence; (3) it promotes “benign borders” and good neighbourly relations between countries in Latin America in areas that are subject to tension or particularly vulnerable, primarily through initiatives that foster confidence among neighbouring communities; and (4) encourages political dialogue among Latin American countries as a means to ease bilateral and intra-regional tensions and to support understanding and consensus-building at the regional and subregional levels. In order to identify specific areas of intervention and strengthen cooperation with its Latin American partners and interlocutors, CITpax undertakes missions to countries in the region.

Areas of Activity:
- Encouragement of political dialogue at the regional and subregional levels
- Institutional stability in the Andean Region
- Alternatives to the Colombian conflict
- Promotion of “benign borders” and good neighbourly relations

Conflict Prevention and Resolution

The focus of this programme is threefold: 1) to analyse and support peace processes through the means of Track II diplomacy; 2) to monitor and assist countries undergoing situations of transitional justice while promoting peace-building and democracy; and 3) from the perspective of conflict prevention, to promote the adoption of concrete measures to mitigate the underlying causes of conflicts. The projects and activities of the programme are embedded within the broader concept of human security and aspire to its realization. Within this framework and via the practical study of international responses to crisis situations, including international armed interventions, the programme aims at strengthening the civil dimension of international crisis management and the establishment of frameworks to permit adequate coordination with the military dimension.

Areas of Activity:
- Peace processes and peace-building
- Crisis management and regional and international responses to conflict
- Transitional justice and strengthening of the Rule of Law
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR)
- Strengthening of civil society and support for the most vulnerable sectors
- Role of the media in peace processes

STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL

Shlomo Ben-Ami, Executive Vice-President
Emilio Cassinello, Director General, Ambassador of Spain
Claudia Medina, Projects Director
Pilar Sánchez-Bella, Personal Assistant to the Vice-President

Latin America Programme

Blanca Antonini, Director
Patricia Pérez-Gómez, Projects Coordinator
Juan Garrigues, Desk Officer

Africa and the Middle East Programme

George E. Irani, Director
Mónica Martínez, Projects Coordinator
Stuart Reigeluth, Desk Officer
Shireen Dajani, Programme Assistant

Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme

Luis Peral, Director
Gabriel Reyes, Desk Officer

Administrative Staff

Olga Hornero, Administration
Paula Navarro, Office Manager
Olga Sánchez, Assistant to the Directorate

Communication and Funding

Nuria Ayarra, Communication and Web
María Paula Torres, Funding and Project Cycle Management

Offices Abroad

Andean Region: Pedro Medellín
Middle East: Pini Meidan-Shani
ABOUT THE TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PEACE
(www.toledopax.org)

Trustees:

Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
José María Barreda, President, Regional Government of Castilla-La Mancha
José Manuel Molina, Mayor of Toledo

Shlomo Ben-Ami, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Israel
Antonio Garrigues Walker, President, Fundación José Ortega y Gasset
Diego Hidalgo Schnur, President, FRIDE
Gregorio Marañón, President, Real Fundación de Toledo
Nabil Shaath, Deputy Prime Minister, Palestinian National Authority
Carlos Westendorp, Spanish Ambassador to the United States
Advisory Council:

Emma Bonino*, Member of the European Parliament.
Kim Campbell, Secretary-General of the Club of Madrid, former Prime Minister of Canada.
Baltasar Garzón, Judge of the National Audience, Spain.
Marrack Goulding, Dean, St Anthony’s College, Oxford University.
Rosario Green, former Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Bernard Kouchner, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo.
Juan Manuel Santos*, former Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Colombia.
Pierre Schori, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Cote d’Ivoire.
Francesc Vendrell, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan.
Federico Mayor Zaragoza, former Director-General of the UNESCO.

* In absentia, while in office

Corporate Advisory Council:

Strategic Partners:

Iberia
Telefónica
Repsol YPF
Grupo Villar Mir

Project Partners:

CCM
Uría Menéndez