

*Institutional framework and
civilian resources for inter-
national crisis management in
Spain: commitments, alternatives
and advantages*

**Working paper
February, 2006**

Limited circulation

© Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz – CITpax 2006

CITpax Documents are available in the web page: www.toledopax.org

The views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CITpax

***Institutional framework and civilian
resources for international crisis
management in Spain: commitments,
alternatives and advantages***

Index

| | |
|--|-------|
| Acronyms | p. 7 |
| Presentation , by Emilio Cassinello (Director-General, CITpax) | p. 8 |
| Summary | p. 10 |
| Report , by Luis Peral (Senior Researcher, CEPC/FRIDE), with the collaboration of Juan Garrigues and Gabriel Reyes (Desk Officers, CITpax) | p. 15 |
| Commitments | p. 15 |
| European Union | p. 15 |
| United Nations | p. 19 |
| Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe | p. 22 |
| Alternatives | p. 24 |
| Coordination, Advisory and Analysis Bodies | p. 24 |
| Rosters and Pools of Experts | p. 26 |
| Specific Training Programmes | p. 29 |
| Advantages | p. 31 |
| Effectiveness of Foreign Crisis-Response Action | p. 31 |
| Continuity of Relations with the Beneficiary Countries and Influence in International Organisations | p. 32 |
| The Enhancement of Training and the Modernisation of the Public Services | p. 33 |
| Notes | p. 36 |

Acronyms

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| AA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany |
| BMVg | Ministry of Defence, Germany |
| BMZ | Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development, Germany |
| CIMIC | Civil-Military Co-operation |
| CIVCOM | Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, UE |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| COESPU | Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units |
| CPC | Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE |
| CPS / COPS | Political and Security Committee, UE |
| CRT | Civilian Response Teams, EU |
| CSCE | Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| ECHA | Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, ONU |
| EGF | European Gendarmerie Force |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| IMTF | Integrated Mission Task Forces |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NGO | Non Governmental Organisation |
| ODA | Official Development Aid |
| ODIHR | Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OSCE | Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PCRU | Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit |
| PKO | Peacekeeping Operations |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| REACT | Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams |
| SITCEN | Joint Situation Centre, UE |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| UN | United Nations |

Presentation

Civilian crisis management, a chance to renovate and enhance Spain's foreign action

Spain now has the chance of joining the small vanguard of countries making significant efforts to create new civilian tools for international crisis management. The time is also ripe in the framework of the European Union, which in only three years has made itself the leading actor in the civilian dimension of the international response to crisis situations in third countries. Spain's input in this field would also fit perfectly into the two main initiatives undertaken by the United Nations: the new *integrated missions* and, in the immediate future, the work of the Peacebuilding Commission, formally set up by the General Assembly and the Security Council on 20 December 2005.

Although it is not easy to define exactly what is meant by crisis management as part of foreign action, the crucial character of civilian aspects in peacebuilding endeavours is becoming increasingly obvious. Even at the very peak of the conflict, the international civilian police –witness the new European Gendarmerie Force– should play a complementary role to the strictly military action, as a guarantee of the still uncertain concept of *human security*. From the beginning international rapid-deployment teams contribute to the success of such missions. Teams of judges and public prosecutors, human rights observers or experts in the rule of law, in security sector reforms, the media and economic and environmental affairs are deployed immediately or at least begin to plan their future action.

But the new civilian crisis-management tools created by democratic and developed States can also help to prevent conflicts, given that their primary function is to strengthen democratic institutions and protect human rights in fragile States. Their action, however, must always be part and parcel of the operations deployed by the competent international organisations, so that they can help to put into practice the concept of *effective multilateralism* as proclaimed in the European Security Strategy of 2003. These resources have to complement the work being carried out by democratic armies and round out the essential work of the non-governmental organisations as providers of humanitarian assistance and development agents, without overshadowing this work in any way whatsoever.

Furthermore, our growing importance in international crisis management should have a qualitative reflection in terms of the modernisation and reform of Spain's Foreign Service. Spain's foreign action has undergone an inevitable transformation in the last three decades in line with the political evolution ushered in by the transition from dictatorship to democracy. At the beginning of this period Spain burst onto an international stage it had largely been excluded from beforehand, especially in such organisations as NATO and in the European integration process, taking on unprecedented objectives and ambitions. Today the challenges are quite different; the new concepts of cooperative diplomacy, human security, the consolidation of peace and democracy are all underpinning a necessary renovation, which in turn must lead inevitably to new capabilities.

On the basis of the above realities the *Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz* (Toledo International Centre for Peace), with the sponsorship of the *Ministerio de Defensa* (Ministry of Defence) and the *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation) has set in motion an ambitious project that aims to contribute towards the international and European debate in this field. We have sent missions of experts to Germany, Holland, Norway and the United Kingdom and

also to the European institutions and they have drawn up reports on the respective systems for responding to crises in third countries. We are now presenting this working document, which analyses the international commitments in this field and gives a complete, albeit not exhaustive, overview of existing initiatives, while also offering arguments on the need of advancing along the path marked out in particular by the European Union¹.

Spain's Foreign Minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, member of our Board, quite rightly pointed out the following in his speech to the special session of the Security Council on 22 September 2004, "the civilian aspects of crisis management will be effective only if based on dialogue and cooperation between the various stakeholders. They are therefore in themselves a school of negotiation and commitment seeking, in other words, a fundamental input to the rebuilding of a democratic culture in societies laid waste by recent conflict. Their legitimacy and effectiveness will thereby be enhanced insofar as they ensure the coordination of all actors. Furthermore, by involving local actors from the beginning in drawing up the peace mission strategies, they will help to ensure the sustainability of peacebuilding measures"².

With these words the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation succinctly summarized the reasons for international civilian action in crisis situations and the purposes thereof, concentrating both on the benefits it brings to the societies it is carried out in and the advantages obtained by the country carrying it out. But this summary also shows that the Toledo Centre itself could be considered to be a part of the international crisis management promoted and executed from Spain; as such it is therefore bound to be an active element in the institutional framework we aim to strengthen and consolidate in this project.

It would therefore like to reiterate, on behalf of the team I run and in my own name, our commitment of taking on this task with responsibility, enthusiasm and thoroughness, mindful of the fact that – as a classic writer put it a few centuries ago: "Peace is not only better than war, but infinitely more arduous".

Emilio Cassinello
Director-General, CITpax

¹ The reports have been written by Mariano Aguirre (FRIDE – Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), Cristina Churrua (Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany), Luis Peral (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales / FRIDE), Gabriel Reyes (CITpax), and Allison Rohe (FRIDE); the consolidated report has been drawn up by Luis Peral, Gabriel Reyes and Juan Garrigues (CITpax).

² Speech by Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, in the thematic debate of the Security Council on the civilian aspects of crisis management and peacebuilding. New York, 22 September 2004, <http://www.spainun.org/pages/viewfull.cfm?ElementID=2183>

Institutional framework and civilian resources for international crisis management in Spain: commitments, alternatives and advantages

Summary

Introduction

Peacekeeping operations have always entailed the overseas projection of a State's military capabilities for helping the populations of another State; similarly, peacebuilding operations must entail the overseas projection of its civilian capabilities to the same end. The general trend in the EU, OSCE and UN is to increase the civilian component of their crisis management operations; this calls for the active liaison and involvement of all States.

The creation of civilian resources for responding to crises in third States allows the Government to enhance its action capability and ipso facto its influence and prestige in the international arena. These resources certainly offer the possibility of *modulating* and graduating the State's involvement in the crises affecting other States without the need of making any troop commitments.

A State that decides to set up specialised crisis management civilian resources of can also use them as a complement to the dispatching of military or police units. Thus, the efforts made in human and financial resources could be rounded out by the parallel deployment of suitable instruments for exercising a greater degree of influence in the international response to the crisis situation in question.

Commitments

EUROPEAN UNION

- Crisis management in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy has taken on a markedly civilian character. Exclusively civilian missions created by the EU to tackle crisis situations in third countries now far outnumber missions of a military character. The trend is also to increase the weight of the civilian component in all European military missions.
- That said, European external action depends largely on the input of human and material resources by the Member States in the interests of reinforcing the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. The main challenge now facing the EU is therefore to build up a wide range of capabilities and resources, both in the civilian and military dimension, to be able to come up with a quick, efficient and coherent response to the crises that arise in third countries.
- In the last three years the Union has taken a number of substantial steps in terms of endowing its ambitious plans of external action with human resources. The 25 Member States have not only taken on but have also begun to fulfil the commitment to endow the EU with a wide range of civilian capabilities as agreed in the framework of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

- But the Union aims to go further than mere quantitative commitments; there is a growing awareness, also in the States themselves, of the need to come up with qualitative contributions towards the peacebuilding process. Fruit of this new awareness is the innovative concept of the Civilian Response Teams (CRT), which are capable of carrying out highly specialised civilian missions, either single-handedly or as part of international operations of an integrated character.

- National processes therefore need to be set in motion for the selection and training of specialized and highly qualified civilian personnel to form part of the various European missions. In this increasingly dynamic context some Member States, including Spain, have the potential and capacity for becoming leading suppliers of civilian resources for international crisis management.

UNITED NATIONS

- The resurgence of armed conflicts in a high percentage of countries in which UN peace operations had been established and the substantial increase in the number and size of these operations have prompted significant changes in their design, giving rise to the *integrated missions*. The proposal of creating a standing UN police capacity and, on a general institutional plan, a *Peacebuilding Commission* are both important steps towards the translation of “humanitarianism” into broader operational terms.

- The great challenge now facing the UN is to ensure that these new missions are capable of creating and strengthening local democracies and human-rights protection mechanisms, thus contributing towards a lasting peace. The possible contributions of developed States include furnishing the General Secretariat with civilian teams that are highly specialised in such tasks; this might well be the best way of tackling today’s peacebuilding challenges.

OSCE

- Operations undertaken by the OSCE made clear the need for the rapid deployment of qualified civilian personnel; the answer was to set up a programme of *Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams* (REACT). The creation of civilian resources for external crisis-response action by Member States could improve the quality of the programme, while maintaining the principle of complementarity.

- Recent proposals have shown that the work of some OSCE bodies such as the *Conflict Prevention Centre* and the *Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights* could be strengthened if the most developed States set up civilian crisis management tools to contribute towards the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights in the other member States.

Alternatives

COORDINATION, ADVISORY AND ANALYSIS BODIES

- The coherence of the State's external action in crisis situations depends on the coordination of the different instruments and resources deployed in the framework of each international mission. It is therefore necessary to establish general objectives and create a minimum institutional structure for coordinating the actions undertaken and checking the fulfilment of such objectives. It is also necessary to carry out a daily monitoring of the evolution of the crisis for which the State has deployed missions of a civilian character and also of the response given to such crises by international organisations and by other States.
- The ever-changing nature of international crisis response means that advisory mechanisms need to be set up in governmental bodies, or as part of external institutions or bodies, to advise the government on the action it takes. These may be public, private or mixed in character.
- At a time when new capabilities are likely to be created, it is vital to ensure coherent and coordinated action of existing capabilities. The best way of doing this would be to draw up a national Action Plan.

EXPERT TEAMS AND ROSTERS

- The drawing up of rosters of experts is today considered to be the best way of managing national human resources and making an effective contribution to the evermore complex and specialised missions of civilian crisis management. These lists or rosters, under the supervision of the State response coordinating body, guarantee a rapid deployment of resources.
- In Spain there is still scarce involvement of civilian personnel from the government in peacebuilding tasks; this means that it would be best to set up rosters of an exclusively public character or to create incentives for the participation of tenured government officials in common lists.
- These national mechanisms will be effective and opportune only if they are complementary to the existing initiatives in other States and international organisations. They must also be flexible in character, enabling selected experts to be drafted into multinational integrated operations.
- In light of current trends the most useful input might be the creation of rosters not of individual experts but rather of small State-run rapid-deployment teams, which could themselves take on highly specialised tasks as part of larger scale supranational teams or wide-ranging international arrangements.

SPECIFIC TRAINING PROGRAMMES

- The key factor in setting up civilian crisis management resources is their highly specialised character; hence the essential importance of suitable personnel training. This training has to be specific and intensive and has to be supervised by the ministerial department promoting the resource deployment and /or the central coordination body. It also has to be certified by the various organisations whose multilateral operations the civilian personnel are going to join.

- It is therefore vital to set up liaison networks between the training centres and centralise the information on the syllabi and on the manuals and other training material in Spain and in other countries. In particular, the permanent liaison contact with training centres set up in other EU Member States should give rise to joint training initiatives.

Advantages

- The following advantages are to be gained from the creation and deployment of civilian resources for international crisis management:
 - It increases the government's capacity of political action in the international arena, allowing it to exercise a direct influence on the conflict-resolution and peacebuilding process in the beneficiary State;
 - It enhances the State's prestige and influence inside the international organisations working in the field of international peace and security;
 - It enables the *national interest* to be brought into tune with multilateralism and international solidarity;
 - It introduces what we could call the *constitutional hinge* between the army and the NGOs of the State creating them, opening up new perspectives of non governmental action;
 - It guarantees the continuity of the bilateral relations between the States sending and receiving the civilian teams, independently of the multilateral umbrella under which the deployment is carried out;
 - It stimulates the training of general government personnel and
 - It promotes the exchanging of experiences and working techniques between officials of the international organisations of different countries.
- In the Spanish case the modernising impulse to be gained from the creation of new international crisis management resources does not entail the need of making new financial commitments, since it can benefit from the sharp increase, already committed, of Official Development Assistance. Furthermore, all ministerial departments have training funds, a suitable proportion of which could be spent on the preparation of teams for their international deployment.

Institutional framework and civilian resources for international crisis management in Spain: commitments, alternatives and advantages

Report

Commitments

EUROPEAN UNION

1. Crisis management in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy has taken on a markedly civilian character. **Exclusively civilian missions created by the EU to tackle crisis situations in third countries – such as those deployed in Rafah, Transnistria or Aceh, in the latter case jointly with ASEAN States and Switzerland and Norway – now far outnumber missions of a military character.** Even leaving aside the classic civilian missions of election observation, the catalogue of recent operations clearly shows this new European trend, which can also be considered to be a general trend in the international community. Of the ten operations launched by the European Council since the end of 2004, only one of them –EUFOR-ALTHEA, deployed in Bosnia Herzegovina– is military in character.
2. **The trend is also to increase the weight of the civilian component in all European military missions.** Among the most recent proposals, the report called A Human Security Doctrine for Europe recommended that a rapid-response force be set up within the EU for tackling situations of grave and massive violations of human rights in any part of the world. According to the report, this force should initially be 15,000 strong; one third of this personnel should be police and civilian specialists³. In its broader sense, however, civilian crisis management also includes such aspects as the strengthening of democratic institutions and human rights protection mechanisms in Failed States or States in transition towards democracy, thus fulfilling a preventive function to head off potential conflicts, a function that has taken on key importance in the international community.
3. As recently expressed by Javier Solana, Secretary General of the EU Council and High Representative for the CFSP, “If there is a “lesson learned” from interventions in crisis areas such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan/Darfur, the Congo and many others, it is the need to enhance our effectiveness through better coordination of civilian and military crisis management instruments”. And he adds: “we have learned that there is no simple sequencing of military first and civilians later. The strictly military phase of crisis management is never as short as one thinks or hopes. And the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts are never as civilian as one wishes. Thus we need both civilian and military tools from day one”².
4. **The European Union has declared itself ready to share in the responsibility “for global security and building a better world”, especially since the Council adopted the European Security Strategy in 2003**³. But European external action depends largely on the input of material and human resources by Member States, especially for carrying out international crisis management operations of a civilian character. The Union has therefore started to define policies and its own mechanisms for promoting the creation of national civilian structures.

Bodies created by the EU for articulating the civilian and military aspects of crisis management

Since 2001 the Political and Security Committee –CPS, or COPS in its French initials – has been seeing to the international management of crises in both the civilian and military dimension thereof, doing so under the authority of the EU Council; it is also responsible for the political control and strategic guidance of crisis management operations. In the purely civilian dimension, in 2000 the Council had also created the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which provides COPS with information, advises it and makes recommendations, concentrating on the provision of police capabilities and the reinforcement of the rule of law.

Alongside this committee, new administrative departments of an auxiliary and technical character have begun to emerge, emphasising the civilian dimension of crisis management. The Council has set up a *Joint Situation Centre* (SITCEN), with both military and civilian personnel, which keeps the Council informed of the development of crises outside the Union. The Council Secretariat also has a *Police Unit*. Finally a Civilian-Military Cell has been set up within the European Union's Military Staff (EUMS); this cell must be capable of becoming an operation control centre.

Together with the strictly military mechanisms, with regard to which the Headline Goal 2003 has been adopted as a complement to the CIMIC concept (Civilian-military cooperation)⁴, The Helsinki European Council of 1999 decided to set up a parallel mechanism for coordinating civil protection resources. This mechanism, which runs various databases, aims to coordinate the various civilian resources assigned by the Union and Member States to the management of crises outside the Union and make them more effective, essentially those resources related with civil protection.

5. **The main challenge now facing the EU in this sphere is to build up the widest possible range of capabilities and resources, both in the civilian and military dimension, in order to be able to come up with a quick, efficient and coherent response to the crises that emerge in third countries.** The Union and its Member States have to be capable of setting up conflict-prevention and peace-keeping operations and also missions involving combat forces for imposing and re-establishing peace. But they must also be capable of contributing towards the peacebuilding endeavour by the deployment of their own resources capable of creating and strengthening democratic institutions in third States before, during and immediately after a crisis situation.
6. The creation of the European Gendarmerie Force is a clear sign of the commitment of some Member States to increasing European capabilities of a civilian character –albeit in this case police corps of a military nature– to ensure the effective protection of populations affected by armed conflicts and violations

of human rights in third countries. The European Council of Santa Maria da Feira, held in June 2000, confirmed the States' undertaking that by 2003, cooperating voluntarily, they will be able to provide up to 5000 police officers for international missions across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations, 1000 of them with a 30-day deployment capacity⁵.

European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)

The EGF draws from the police corps of a military nature in France (Gendarmerie), Portugal (Guardia Nacional Republicana), Italy (Carabinieri), Holland (Royal Marechaussee) and Spain (Guardia Civil). This force will be responsible for running operations for the maintenance of security and public order, supervising and advising local police, criminal investigation, traffic regulation and border control. By the end of 2007 it has to build up the capability of deploying 800 officers in any part of the world within 30 days. The Spanish Guardia Civil will supply the EGF with up to 400 of the former's future *Agrupación Exterior* (Foreign Grouping). This could mean the involvement of over 1000 officers, who have to include personnel of any speciality required for each EGF mission.

The General Headquarters of the EGF was opened in Vicenza (Italy) on 23 January 2006, while Spain took on the presidency of its governing body, the High Level Inter-Ministry Committee. Spain will also take charge of the general field test for the first EGF operation in a post-war scenario. The exercise will be held in Valdemoro (Madrid), including the deployment of a general headquarters and evaluation of the planning, management and running of real operations.

Although the EGF does not depend directly on the European Union, it will nonetheless be at the latter's disposition and also of the other institutions like the UN, NATO and OSCE, which can count on its backing for carrying out police missions even in areas of conflict.

7. **The European Council of Feira also identified three civilian aspects of international crisis management which it deems to be top priority for the EU: rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.** Subsequently, in the framework of the Second Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2004, the 25 Member States went even further than the Feira targets, taking on the firm commitment of providing the European Union with 5761 police, 631 experts on the rule of law, 562 experts on civil administration and 4988 in the field of civil protection. The States also undertook to guarantee that the training and rapid-deployment capability of the designated personnel would be satisfactory. They also established new civilian capabilities for European crisis management, especially in the monitoring field, assigning 505 experts thereto, while also assigning 391 experts to such matters as the protection of human rights, political affairs, gender and security force reforms. These experts will be able to back up the work being carried out by the EU Special Representatives for CFSP⁶.

Civilian Headline Goal 2008

The Goal adopted during the Ministerial Conference of 22 November 2004 takes in the full range of instruments for civilian crisis management and aims to facilitate interaction between them. Its objectives are:

- Achieve a coherent use of civilian community instruments in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
- Build up the capability of carrying out missions not only in top-priority areas of civilian crisis management as agreed in the Feira European Council but also observation missions and backup missions for EU Special Representatives.
- Develop the capability for deploying multifunctional civilian-crisis-management resources in an integrated framework.
- Develop the capability for deploying civilian missions implying diverse levels of commitment and the use of different capabilities, including at least a large-scale mission of short-term substitution in a hostile environment.
- Build up the capacity to initiate a mission within the 5 days following the adoption of the Council decision and deploying specific civilian capabilities of the European Security and Defence Policy within the 30 days following the decision to initiate the mission.
- Deploy European missions of civilian crisis management in a joint and autonomous way and in close cooperation with military operations.

8. The Union's civilian crisis management action therefore takes in groundbreaking areas, ranging from the observation of human rights to mediation, and from the administration of justice to border surveillance and even including actions for the prevention of organised crime and human trafficking. The process of creating resources and extending the fields of civilian action abroad has taken on an unprecedented dynamism. Witness the Brussels European Council of 15 and 16 December 2005, which endorsed the creation of rapid reaction teams made up by national experts able to provide technical and operational assistance to any Member State at times of high influxes of illegal immigrants or asylum seekers. In its informal meeting in Vienna on 15 January 2006 the Justice and Home Affairs Council decided that these "rapid intervention teams", made up by interpreters, administrative personnel and psychologists, would be up and running by the summer⁷. In this case it is a question of activities that would be carried out on the EU borders, but nothing prevents the teams from being sent to third countries where refugees and migrants directly or indirectly come from, as part of the foreign dimension of the common policy on migration and asylum⁸.
9. **In light of the most recent developments it can safely be claimed that peacebuilding inputs of a qualitative character are now tending to outweigh the quantitative commitments, without downplaying the importance of the latter in the least.** Although the number of civilian personnel deployed for international crisis management tasks is sometimes high, as in the case of civil protection or police, in most of the new fields of action it is a question of identifying experts or creating

small teams of highly qualified personnel who are capable of making an effective contribution to the task of strengthening the institutions of the State suffering the crisis. Hence the advent within the EU of the groundbreaking conception of Civilian Response Teams (CRTs), which can carry out very specialised missions, either single-handedly or within the framework of international operations of an integrated character⁹. Norway collaborates actively with the EU in this area¹⁰ and has already begun to set up these complete and quasi-autonomous teams of civilian personnel in the context of the strengthening of the judicial system and the rule of law, and will shortly do so as well in the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR).

10. The CRTs, which will be up and running by the end of this year, show how much the EU depends on the Member States' readiness to make these inputs of civilian personnel. Each CRT is set up on the basis of experts previously selected by the States and in due accordance with the particular needs of each mission. **It is hence necessary to set up national processes for the selection and training of specialised and highly qualified civilian personnel for joining the various European missions.** In the coming years the Member States will develop new national coordination structures and adapt existing ones in the interests of harmonising the processes of capturing and training civilian personnel. This process should facilitate a considerable increase in the amount of exchanged information and *lessons learned* in the framework of the EU. Only by improving the national capabilities for planning and carrying out civilian crisis management missions will the Union be able to play a peacebuilding role in keeping with its economic importance.
11. In this increasingly dynamic context some Member States, including Spain, have the potential and capability of becoming leading suppliers of civilian resources for international crisis management, outstripping even the commitments made within the framework of the EU. **In at least some crisis response fields it is possible today for countries to lead the field by carrying out their own foreign action which is more effective without ceasing to be fully European and multilateral.**

UNITED NATIONS

12. The resurgence of armed conflicts in a high percentage of countries in which UN peacekeeping operations had been established and the substantial increase in the number and size of these operations have prompted significant changes in the design thereof¹¹. In very broad terms, and leaving aside the temporary civilian administrations set up in Timor and Kosovo, the UN has progressively shed the model based on military intervention of a humanitarian character – designed to set up a safe space for providing humanitarian aid – in favour of increasing peacebuilding action in the framework of what have become known as integrated missions¹². According to an independent study conducted at the behest of the UN's Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), published in May 2005, an integrated mission is "an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework"¹³.

13. **The question here is how to fill the void left by the UN's blue helmets or, to put it another way, how to avoid the perpetuation of international presence and therefore an external dependence without building a *strong local democracy*.** Peacekeeping missions offered at most a stopgap solution to the suffering of the victims of an armed conflict or violation of human rights but they have not proved capable of facilitating the transition to the democracy that would serve as the basis for building a victim-free State. There is, however, no more lasting and specific method of ensuring respect for human rights than that of creating State institutions that see to guaranteeing these rights when the UN mission has moved out, or supporting the reestablishment of said institutions. **Integrated missions, under a single civilian command, incorporate new fields of civilian action, such as institutional strengthening or sustainable development, which have been developed inside the UN and are today deemed to be a sine qua non condition for lasting peace.**
14. The UN intends to pay due heed to all the factors that determine the achievement of lasting peace without detriment to the operational agility and effectiveness of the missions. In particular, structural changes of diverse nature are proposed, some of which are already being implemented in areas such as planning or personnel selection and training both in the missions and in the headquarters. One of the most important innovations of an operational character inside the UN is the creation of the *Integrated Missions Task Forces* (IMTF), a planning and coordinating instrument used for the first time in Afghanistan in 2001. The IMTFs pool the different programmes and agencies of the UN family to ensure a balanced deployment of all the components of an integrated mission.
15. In some areas of the new UN missions the qualitative aspect is beginning to override the quantitative aspect. As pointed out on 30 January 2006 by Mark Kroeker, UN Police Advisor, the role of UN police on peacekeeping missions evolves towards capability building for local forces and away from strictly monitoring and observing, the need to recruit better quality officers becomes paramount. These leaders need to have a better leadership capability, excellent training and be capable of getting their knowledge across to others¹⁴. **The creation of highly specialised civilian resources to be placed at the disposition of the UN by developed States is perhaps the best way of addressing the current peacebuilding challenges.**
16. In this field of police action, which takes on special importance as the most specific guarantee of *human security* in crisis situations, the World Summit held in September 2005 advocated the creation of a standing UN police capacity. But the most far-reaching institutional innovation of this September 2005 summit was the approval for the creation of a UN *Peacebuilding Commission*; this decision is bound to have profound effects in this field in coming years.

The World Summit on UN Reform and Crisis Management

The Summit Outcome Document (Doc. A/60/L.1) aims to set up a line of continuity between peacekeeping and peacebuilding questions. It concentrates on the measures that should be taken by the UN to thwart the threats to peace.

The Peacebuilding Commission, whose creation was provided for in the Outcome Document, was formally set up by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN on 20 December 2005.

This Commission, whose composition is still under debate today, is an intergovernmental advisory body whose main functions are to propose integrated peacebuilding strategies, help to ensure predictable and continuous financing, identify the best peacebuilding strategies (doing so in collaboration with the General Secretariat, where a support office will be set up) and in general extend the time period that the international community devotes to post-conflict recovery, in the political, social and economic aspects. The Commission will include an Organisational Committee and country-specific committees, whose main role is to involve national stakeholders, civil society and other regional organisations.

The Document also refers to the need of setting up rapid deployment units to reinforce peacekeeping activities. Furthermore –and this is where UN is bringing into operation the concept of *human security* from the response resources point of view– the Outcome Document endorses the creation of a standing UN police capacity to provide start-up capability for the policing component of the United Nations peacekeeping missions and to assist existing missions through the provision of advice and expertise. This represents a recognition that the effective guaranteeing of human rights calls for the exponential increase of the civilian capabilities of peace missions, starting with the police component.

17. **In the UN, the international community has expressed its conviction to consolidate these integrated missions, whose ultimate objective is to strengthen the democratic structures of the States they act in.** Now it is in particular the responsibility of the developed countries to make the necessary changes in their national structures to contribute towards the smooth operation of these new missions. Possible State inputs include furnishing the General Secretariat with highly specialised civilian teams capable of joining in an integrated mission for creating or strengthening local democratic institutions and human rights protection mechanisms that could be of great help in achieving lasting peace. Just as peacekeeping operations have always involved the overseas projection of a State's military capabilities for helping the populations of another State, peacebuilding operations involve the external projection of its civilian capabilities to the same end.
18. Regarding military resources, the EU has proposed to the UN that two different rapid response models should be developed. On the one hand there would be bridging operations, which would involve the immediate deployment of European troops while the UN organises or reinforces its mission, as occurred in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis Case). On the other there would be the stand-by model, hardly developed as yet, involving a close coordination so that troops can carry out certain complex and very specialised tasks in the framework of UN missions¹⁵. The EGF has come into being with the same aim of contributing towards the effective multilateralism advocated by the European Security Strategy in the context of police forces whose nature is nonetheless comparable to a military force. **There is absolutely nothing preventing the EU and its Member States from providing the UN, on a case by case basis, with the new civilian resources for international crisis management in either of the two arrangements outlined above with regard to military resources.**

The high qualification required for carrying out certain institution-building functions as part of an integrated UN mission would make this EU contribution to multilateralism particularly useful.

OSCE

19. The OSCE has been the pioneering international organisation in developing a multidimensional security concept, which has also been put into practice in the form of civilian crisis management mechanisms. **Perception of the need for rapid deployment of qualified civilian personnel in OSCE operations prompted the creation of the programme of *Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT)*.** This need had been expressed by Heads of State and Government of all OSCE States in the framework of the European Security Charter adopted in Istanbul in 1999. REACT came on stream in 2001, since when it has been pre-selecting, recruiting and training experts in the fields of human rights, rule of law, democratisation, elections, economic and environmental affairs, press and public information, media development, political affairs, administrative backup, communications, information technologies, security, transport, provisioning and logistics, budgeting and finances, human resources, training facility management, personnel management and supervision, military affairs and civilian police.

OSCE Missions

The OSCE has a wealth of experience in organising missions of an exclusively civilian character, especially for the purpose of election observation. The missions depend on the mandate agreed by the organisation's Permanent Council. Its main functions are:

- Advising the host country on the organisation and supervision of elections.
- Providing support for strengthening the rule of law and building democratic institutions; maintaining and restoring public order.
- Helping to foster a negotiation-friendly climate favourable to the adoption of pacific conflict-solving measures.
- Supervise arms control agreements.
- Providing support for the rehabilitation or reconstruction of diverse aspects or components of civil society.

The experts are pre-selected by the Member States to form part of the missions, either long-term or short-term. Long-term missions, usually lasting six months, are in the fields of conflict prevention and rehabilitation or reconstruction. Short-term missions, usually lasting from seven to fifteen days, focus on the closure of the election campaign, the voting procedure and vote counts. The authorities of each party State furnish the OSCE secretariat with a list of national candidates for secondment to the created missions. It is therefore necessary to set up an institutional process for the pre-selection of candidates.

As regards Spain's contribution, around twenty Spanish nationals are currently taking part in OSCE missions. The experts to participate in observation missions are selected by the Human Rights Office (Oficina de Derechos Humanos) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores). The list is drawn up from the Spanish nationals that have registered their candidature on the roster of election observers of the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and who meet certain general eligibility requisites such as a higher degree and a command of English as well as more specific requisites that might be laid down by the organisation deploying the mission for each elections.

20. The OSCE comprises several organisations that promote democracy and human rights, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media or the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the latter with a marked conflict-prevention character. As well as these the Member States of the then Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) created in 1990 the *Conflict Prevention Centre* (CPC). The CPC is responsible for direct liaison between the central bodies of the OSCE and the field operations with regard to the four main spheres of action: early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. In July 2005 the organisation was running 18 operations in 16 countries. The work of the CPC and the ODIHR might be strengthened by the setting up of civilian crisis management resources by the party States, especially the most developed ones, to help in the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights in the other party States.
21. Among the operations that the OSCE has set in motion in recent years is the Baku Office. Designed in 2004 in collaboration with the Azerbaijan Ombudsman, it is a rapid reaction unit for dealing with any violations of human rights in the Azerbaijan detention centres. The aim of the programme was to check reported cases and pass them on to the Ombudsman's office in a few hours, draw up a final report including recommendations and send it up to the Azerbaijan authorities and train police officers, detention-centre officials, judges and public prosecutors in the rights of detainees. For that purpose the OSCE set up a rapid reaction team within the national institution and a permanently operative call centre. The more developed States could certainly offer the OSCE a most valuable collaboration in operations of this type. The ODIHR is currently studying projects to be set up in Moldavia and Georgia, which will be executed by the crisis response mechanism for the handling of crisis situations in the justice sector, created by the government of Norway¹⁶.
22. As the State delegations have once again made it clear in the latest Security Review Conference, the OSCE is ready to cooperate with the international institutions and organisations concerned in the interests of achieving effective interaction in crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation matters, with special emphasis on strengthening the rule of law¹⁷. One of the most important proposals to be debated in the Conference was the possibility of setting up some type of association between the OSCE and the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), a project based in Vicenza, Italy, which is supported by the United States and aims to tap into the experience and expertise of the

Carabinieri, the Gendarmerie and similar forces with the intention of setting up similar units in other countries¹⁸. It is no coincidence that Vicenza is also the headquarters of the EGF; this offers excellent opportunities of collaboration in this field, so that the creation of rapid deployment resources can be drawn on for the training and reform of State security corps in third countries. The example, still under study, could be extended to other fields of international crisis management.

Alternatives

COORDINATION, ADVISORY AND ANALYSIS BODIES

23. **The coherence of the State's foreign action in crisis situations depends on the coordination of the various instruments and measures deployed in each case.** Maybe due to the particular organisation of armies or because their foreign action in crisis situation is by now well established, coordination is especially necessary when such instruments and measures have a civilian character. There is also likely to be a considerable increase in the participation of persons attached to various ministerial departments in the international and European frameworks of crisis management, and it will be necessary to coordinate and supervise the action of the civilian and military components deployed by the State in each crisis situation. Besides the coordination aspects, the ever-changing nature of international crisis response means that advisory mechanisms need to be set up to guide the government's action. Finally, the development of the crisis for which the State has deployed civilian missions should be monitored on a daily basis, as well as the response to such crises provided by international organisations or by other States. **At a time when new capabilities are likely to be created, it is vital to ensure the coherent and coordinated action of existing capabilities. The best way of doing this would be to draw up a national Action Plan.**

Action Plan of the Federal Government of Germany on "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post Conflict Peacebuilding"

In May 2004 the Federal German Government adopted by resolution an Action Plan to govern its own international crisis management policy. The plan first of all addresses the new nature of international conflicts, analyses the government's current capability vis-à-vis such situations and identifies the sectors in which action is necessary. Specifically, it proposes to carry out 161 initiatives over the next five or ten years.

The plan breaks down the initiatives into three main strategic lines:

- creating stable State structures and enhancing the peacebuilding capabilities of civil society;
- improving Germany's contribution to multilateral crisis prevention efforts and
- developing the institutional infrastructure in Germany for civilian crisis prevention.

A member of the Federal Foreign Affairs Ministry (AA), Ambassador Ortwin Hennig, has been appointed as Federal Commissioner for Civilian Crisis Prevention, to fulfil the plan and to develop national capabilities. In September 2004 an *Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention* was set up, chaired by the aforementioned Commissioner. The Steering Group is made up by the AA, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Ministry of Defence (BMVg). The Steering Group is an advisory and coordination body that works towards the coherence of government activities in this field, favours the establishment of coordinated procedures between ministries and enhances the government's capability for carrying out a crisis management policy. The Steering Group has set up an Advisory Board, whose role is to act as mediator between the government and civil society and also to furnish the Steering Group with specialised information. The Advisory Board is made up by representatives of a series of NGOs, research centres and also representatives of the private sector, including Siemens, BASF and Deutsche Bank.

24. Coordination, markedly technical in character, is the responsibility of government authorities. Its effectiveness will hence be directly proportional to the coordination body's closeness to the decision-making body dealing with the crisis management mission on the ground, which decides when to send or maintain a mission or adapt it to the changing circumstances. **In the Spanish case general objectives need to be established in this field together with a minimum institutional structure for coordinating the actions undertaken and monitoring compliance with the government's objectives in general and adherence to the response that needs to be given to each particular crisis situation.** The aim is to build up a complete overview of available capabilities as the first step in taking political decisions and likewise to build up a complete overview of the contribution made to each crisis under the umbrella of the various international organisations, as a means of ensuring compliance with political decisions.

**An example of a coordination mechanism in the
peacebuilding field: The Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Unit of the United Kingdom**

According to the official documents of the Foreign Office, the aim of the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit* (PCRU), set up by the British government in April 2005, is to "ensure that the UK's contribution to post-conflict recovery is better designed, faster and more flexible". The PCRU was set up above all to meet the need for coordinating the efforts made. The PCRU enhances coordination in that it includes representatives from the three most relevant governmental departments in this area (the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department of International Development). The three teams making up the organisation of the PCRU are also led by members of the various departments. The Policy and Strategy Office is run by a diplomat from the Foreign Office; the Operation Planning Office by a Colonel from the Ministry of Defence and the Financial Resources Office by a programme manager from the Department of International Development.

The sheer variety of functions and perspectives that are brought together in the PCRU is also reflected in its extensive database of Deployable Civilian Experts. This database now boasts about 200 professionals from 120 specialities, including health, public finances or local government.

25. Advisory and analysis tasks can be carried out by existing government structures or bodies created *ad hoc* for that purpose or they might also be outsourced to external bodies and institutions of a public or private character. Mixed systems might also be set up. The initial fact-finding operation must always be backed up by an international organisation or a democratic State deployed on the ground. In any case this process must always be supervised and crosschecked as far as possible by the addressee State of the crisis analysis in question. **This means that, apart from the strictly logistic aspects, the more independent the experts and bodies in charge of the analysis and advice are, the more valuable the strategic analysis and ideas on the crisis response will be in terms of the political decision taking process.**

The Clingendael Institute of Holland: Analysis for the Government

The Clingendael Institute of International Relations is a non-profit organisation funded by the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Most of its revenue, however, is generated by its activities. Guarding its independent status and autonomy, Clingendael promotes the understanding of international relations, pursuing this objective by means of studies, reports, projects and acting in an advisory capacity to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter function is part and parcel of the Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (CSCP), which carries out research and analysis projects at the behest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular the Peacebuilding and Good Governance Section (DMV/VG).

The Clingendael Institute is a fine example of how a government can top up its inhouse analysis instruments through an independent centre capable of keeping up a very high degree of objectivity and pooling the opinions of all stakeholders in the crisis management process (ministries, armed forces, NGOs). The recommendations and analyses made by centres of this type are free from outside pressure and even from the distrust that can sometimes exist between government bodies. The risk, which must be avoided at all costs, is of turning these centres into mere instruments of legitimisation for the government's foreign policy objectives.

ROSTERS AND POOLS OF EXPERTS

26. A country's decision to send its own civilian personal for carrying out peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks abroad is a very delicate matter and has to be based on a painstaking short-listing of candidates. The system generally followed in these cases, increasingly widespread since the nineties of last century, is to

- draw up rosters or pools of experts on the basis of applications made by those who are prepared to participate in international crisis management. **These rosters guarantee a rapid deployment and are considered today to be the best way of managing national human resources and making an effective contribution to the increasingly complex and specialised missions of civilian crisis management.** These rosters, under the supervision of the State-response coordination body, have to be updated at least yearly and have to be run in such a way as to ensure that they are useful and mutually complementary.
27. The systems for recruiting experts for international crisis management and placing them on standby vary from country to country and even within countries in terms of speciality and sector. Rosters might include individuals from the private and public sectors – NORDEM in Norway or CANADEM in Canada – or only tenured officials of the State, as is usually the case in the police or justice fields due to the special nature of their duties and the special conditions of those responsible for carrying them out. The sine qua non here is the candidate's proven track record of being able to work in multinational teams on such tasks as building the rule of law and civil administration, monitoring, the protection of human rights or the reform of security forces. **In Spain there is still scarce involvement of civilian personnel from the general government in peacebuilding tasks; this means that it would be best to set up rosters of an exclusively public character or to create incentives for the participation of tenured government officials in common lists.**
28. Possible models might be the following: one great unified database for all specialised activities, sectors and ministries; specialised rosters for each ministry or activity or *across-the-board* rosters, including experts capable of covering the same aspect across different missions, such as organised crime or post-conflict reconstruction. In any case the recruitment of experts for international crisis management calls for a high degree of coordination and a complex administration, a rigorous personnel selection system based on unified criteria, hands-on updated training for all selected candidates, a system of professional and social incentives and a framework guaranteeing the rapid availability and deployability of selected personnel for a long enough period to carry out the task in hand. The key here is to strike the right balance between all these prerequisites.

The Crisis Response Pool for Affairs of Democracy and the Rule of Law of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police

Date of Creation: March 2004.

Composition: 30 professionals, most linked to the judicial sector – ten judges, five military and civilian prosecutors, six police lawyers and nine prison officials; a third of them have a wealth of experience in international missions of the European Union, the UN and OSCE.

Selection Process: The selection process is run by the institution employing the expert, following an initial invitation of applications within the various concerted institutions, on the basis of criteria and procedures laid down by the Ministry of Justice.

Recruitment Eligibility Requisites: The members of the crisis response pool have to have a track record of at least four years as a judge, prosecutor, police lawyer or prison official; they undertake to remain on

the list for at least two years. Half the roster members may be called up for exercising their peacekeeping operations at any time it is deemed necessary.

Training and Incentives: The selected members receive specific training lasting one week and must be ready for deployment within four weeks of notification of the mission. The system is based on a relation of trust between the member of the pool and the public institution he or she works in, given that a previous agreement has to be reached in which said institution gives its employee leave of absence to participate in the mission without thereby harming his or her career in the institution in any way. Experts also retain their salaries during the mission while also receiving the corresponding maintenance allowances, although their temporary employer is in all cases the Ministry of Justice. The members of the pool may be deployed on international missions as individuals or as complete teams.

Fields of Action:

- Advice and assistance for the reform and creation of institutions of the judicial system as part of the democracy building processes.
- Training on human rights and the application of international human rights treaties.
- Operational tasks to do with the administration of justice until local or national institutions are ready to take over the tasks themselves.

29. The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union has just set up its own expert-recruitment method for international crisis management, in line with the efforts made by some Member States and striving not to duplicate these efforts. The EU's constant and committed involvement in the civilian-action response to crises outside its borders calls for a permanent expert-recruitment mechanism to be set up without thereby impinging on the action taken by the Member States. According to current proposals an EU-wide standby force of up to 100 experts will be set up by the end of the year; these could then be drafted into the Civilian Response Teams together with personnel of the Secretariat and, where applicable, from the European Commission. Bearing in mind the principles of coherence and subsidiarity, the CRTs should be complementary to the Community civil protection mechanism and civilian resources for international crisis management created by the Member States, but it is clear that the supranational makeup of expert teams acting in third countries is likely to offer comparative advantages.

The Civilian Response Teams (CRT) of the European Union

The CRTs are rapid reaction resources for civilian crisis management, of flexible composition and size, made up by experts of the Member States and, in principle, with the participation of the General Secretariat of the Council. To ensure coherence of EU's external action, experts from the European Commission will be invited to participate, where possible, in the CRTs. Each one of the experts making up a CRT has to be previously selected by the Member State he or she comes from,

using agreed procedures and criteria. Before their first deployment the experts of the team have to be given specific CRT induction training. The teams will be deployed and act in accordance with generic terms of reference and pre-agreed methodology contained in a CRT Handbook drawn up for that purpose.

30. **A national roster of experts, therefore, will be effective and opportune only if the roster is complementary to the existing initiatives in other States and international organisations. It must also be flexible in character, enabling selected experts to be drafted into multinational integrated operations.** The most useful contribution could be the creation of rosters not of individual experts but rather of small State-run rapid-deployment teams, which could take on highly specialised tasks themselves as part of larger scale supranational teams or wide-ranging international arrangements. Unlike other inputs in which the number of people sent is paramount, for example military and police units, some of these teams could be made up by as few as three to five members, who would carry out highly specialised work of advise and support for the efforts of international agencies and the local authorities. Their responsibility would be to help to set up a true democratic state based on the rule of law. The impact of these teams on the beneficiary State could be more far-reaching and longer lasting than any other measure of the assistance-giving State in relation to the crisis situation in question.

SPECIFIC TRAINING PROGRAMMES

31. The highly specialised character of civilian crisis management resources lends particular importance to the training of the persons and teams who are to be deployed in crisis situations. That said, the training for international crisis management has to be specific, intense and brief, given that the candidates have already been shortlisted on the basis of their professional experience and the relevance thereof for performing certain tasks as part of international missions. **Insofar as the foreign action is public in character, the training received has to be supervised by the ministerial department promoting the resource deployment and /or the central coordination body. It also has to be certified by the various organisations whose multilateral operations the civilian personnel are going to join in.**

Towards a European framework for crisis management training

Approved by the Council on 17 November 2003, the European Union's ESDP training policy defines the political framework and overall operational arrangements for EU's training activities in this area. The policy encompasses the civilian and military dimensions and has been set down in the 2005-2007 training programme. The aim of this policy is to furnish the necessary resources and procedures for analysing the general requisites in terms of planning, execution and evaluation of ESDP training. In practice the 2005-2007 programme is a catalogue of training activities organised by several leading countries in this field.

32. Spain runs some specific training courses for participation in crisis management operations. Worthy of particular note is the Course on International Relations in the Field of Development Cooperation (*Curso sobre relaciones internacionales en el ámbito de la cooperación al desarrollo*), run by tenured officials and organised by the National General Government Institute (Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It lasts ten days and is given in two sessions, one in the spring and one in the autumn. Also worthy of note here is the Course for Peace-Mission Observers (*Curso de observadores para misiones de paz*), given by the Army Warfare School (Escuela de Guerra del Ejército). It is designed for officers of the Armed Forces but a few places are kept free for civilian personnel. In general, however, training initiatives tend to be scattered and the most important and valuable courses are geared mainly towards military personnel. Moreover there is very little assimilation of the advances being made in other countries in terms of studying and knowledge-transmission techniques. It is therefore essential to set up networks between the centres and also to centralise the information on the programmes and on the handbooks and other training material existing in Spain and other countries. **In particular, permanent liaison with training centres set up in other EU Member States should give rise to joint initiatives in the training field.**
33. Training on international action in crisis situations has in any case to be conceived as a necessary complement to the person's established expertise built up in his or her job for the general government or his or her professional experience gleaned in the civilian sphere. The syllabi should include a *common core* on the characteristics, problems and actors in international action, in the framework of the multinational actions into which the candidates are to be seconded. The general framework then has to be fleshed out with shorter courses of a more specific character, bound up with particular characteristics of crisis situations and the particular task to be carried out. It is highly recommendable for the advisory and analysis centres to be actively involved in this phase of the training, both in designing the syllabi and in giving the courses. Finally, a briefing system should be set up to give candidates specific information on the crisis they are to be sent to and the tasks to be assigned them, and also a debriefing system at the end of the mission to give the central coordination body detailed information on the problems found in practice.

The Case of Norway: Training programmes associated with various rosters of a civilian character

NORDEM – Resource Base for Democracy and Human Rights: This is a six-day course on international mechanisms for the protection of human rights and practical fieldwork training, based on a rigorous manual, eminently practical in character, drawn up for that purpose by the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights of Oslo University. There is also an additional three-day election-observation training course. Briefings are organised prior to deployment and there is regular liaison with NORDEM staff during the mission. Secondees submit a final report and the mission is assessed by NORDEM.

International Police Department Pool (Norwegian Police Directorate): Two-week training course for crisis management operations; specific training on the destination country by the head of the police mission on the ground; informal coordination with the action lines emanating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Democracy and Rule-of-Law Pool of the Ministry of Justice and the Police: One-week training in consulting and assistance for creating and strengthening the institutions of the judicial system; Training on human rights and the application of international human rights treaties and training for carrying out operational tasks in the framework of local justice administration.

Advantages

EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN CRISIS-RESPONSE ACTION

34. The efficacy of a developed and democratic State's foreign action in crisis situations is increasingly bound up with effective and direct participation in the building of *strong democracies* through civilian agents (or military in the corresponding tasks) working in the public sector. **The creation of civilian resources for peacebuilding action by developed States therefore represents an increase in the capability of its government's political action in the international arena.** From the viewpoint of the State that creates them, the new specialised civilian crisis management resources represent the most concrete chance of taking an active part and exerting an influence in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding process in the beneficiary State. **If the effectiveness depends on the capacity of adapting the response to each particular situation without forfeiting overall coherence, the developed States are bound to diversify the action resources for international crisis management and guarantee the coordination and integration of these resources in the framework of the international response.**
35. The current trends in international crisis management open up different and less costly participation possibilities than the deployment of large contingents of troops facilitating governments decisions to become involved. But these new options do not limit the effectiveness, they enhance it. Indeed, the effectiveness of foreign action does not depend on sending a greater number of troops or police officers, to be deployed one day without having established any bilateral communication channels; neither does it depend on an increase in Official Development Aid, especially if it is simply a case of increasing the financing of the NGOs based in the contributing State. **The dispatching of small, highly specialised teams, to be drafted into international peace operations could, on the other hand, exert a greater influence on the conflict-solving and democratisation process than other contributions based simply on the number of personnel deployed.**
36. **Civilian crisis management resources are nothing more than instruments at the disposal of the State government sending them.** They can also be pooled, offering a very wide range of possibilities for foreign action in crisis situations. The government can thus *modulate* and graduate its involvement in the third States crises, without needing to make troop-sending commitments. It can also use its specialised civilian resources as a complement to the deployment of military or police units. In the latter case, the quantitative efforts made in terms of money and human resources could be complemented by the parallel deployment of suitable instruments for exerting greater influence in the international response to the crisis situation in question. **As far as Spain in particular is concerned,**

the Government's reform of the Foreign Service, currently underway, could be a good opportunity for including provisions on the creation of civilian resources for foreign action, since their predominantly public character means that such resources can be seen as in some way substituting and/or complementing diplomatic action in crisis situations.

CONTINUITY OF RELATIONS WITH THE BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES AND INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

- 37. Despite the multilateral deployment agenda, the continuity of the bilateral relations between the State sending the highly specialised civilian crisis management teams and the State receiving them is guaranteed from the start and throughout the international intervention.** This relation with the government of a State in construction phase is also useful for the citizens, companies and NGOs of the contributing State, all of whom find public liaison contacts directly involved in the consolidation of the State in which they intend to act. In line with the experience of CIMIC cooperation, and bearing in mind the high profile that a small, highly specialised institution-building team might acquire in the local environment, companies based in the State making the contribution to the peacebuilding effort in a third State could also build up a positive reputation among the authorities and population of that country.
- 38. In light of the above arguments, it is therefore possible to harmonise national interest with multilateralism and international solidarity.** The continuity of bilateral relations in crisis situations favours fluid relations in the future between the contributing State and the beneficiary State. Since the start of the nineties, however, and up to the present date, the humanitarian strategy has tended rather to break off the civilian intergovernmental link until such time as eventual normalisation favours the full reestablishment of diplomatic relations. This strategy has spawned tensions and problems that still linger on between the armed forces and the NGOs. Although formally it is the UN organisations that are carrying out their international mandates, it is the NGOs that are responsible for the programmes on the ground, and they usually end up liaising directly with the armies. **In the new context, the civilian crisis management resources could act as the constitutional hinge between the army and the NGOs. Moreover, this possibility in no way conflicts with the work of the NGOs; it actually open up new perspectives of non-governmental action associated with the action of the civilian crisis management resources deployed by the contributing State.**
- 39. Finally the creation of civilian resources for the management of international crises could enhance the State's prestige and influence in the international organisations working in the field of international peace and security.** At the present moment these organisations guarantee the essential international legitimacy of the intervention, even with the consent of the beneficiary State. But they also offer an umbrella that greatly facilitates the coordinated deployment of the State's contribution towards each crisis situation. The archetypal case today is NATO's action in Afghanistan, which has also become an acid test of the organisations own credibility. In practice, and under its auspices, the contributing

States have set up *Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (PRTs), whose success will depend on their ability to act as catalysers or embryos of a local democratic administration. Bearing in mind the current concern about this matter, the States whose PRTs are the most effective in this sense would gain significant prestige within NATO.

40. **It goes without saying –for the contrary would clearly be a contradiction– that the new government-building task cannot be the responsibility of non-governmental organisations.** The setting up the PRTs begs questions of a constitutional scope, for the administration of a territory in another country entails exercising the *effective control* of this territory and hence the full responsibility for enforcing the respect for the human rights of the local population. In the Spanish case, bearing in mind that it was a question of creating *ex novo* a local civil administration, the military personnel deployed in Afghanistan have had to take on tasks of executing, managing or coordinating the work of the NGOs; these tasks would rightfully correspond to public powers. There is certainly a need for the direct collaboration of tenured officials from the State responsible for running a foreign territory on an interim basis. In the sphere of education, for example, the independent status of NGOs could clash with the need for the school curriculum in the administered territory to abide by the constitutional imperatives of the State responsible for the PRT; neither would it seem reasonable for military personnel to be responsible for enforcing this requirement. **The State that eventually solves these dilemmas and proves capable of meeting these new challenges by projecting abroad the main spheres of its public action will undoubtedly become an international reference.**

THE ENHANCEMENT OF TRAINING AND THE MODERNISATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES

41. In the military sphere peacekeeping operations have had the salutary effect of bringing the training of Spanish troops into line with international standards. Similarly, the peacebuilding operations and the creation and reinforcement of civilian crisis management resources would act as an incentive to the training of the general government's personnel. Language learning is one example. The results of the State school system have been deplorable until recent years and are still far from satisfactory today. Compare this situation with the very high percentage of officers and non-commissioned officers that now have a good command of English - 90% and 80% respectively according to sources consulted in the Army Warfare School. But above all, Spanish tenured officials would be able to swap notes on experiences and working techniques with the officials of international organisations, assimilating the advances in the field of foreign action from the very moment they occur and also contributing to such headway.
42. The system of rosters of experts for international crisis management allows foreign action to tap into resources and instruments that in the most part exist already, and it also offers an opportunity for improving the training and capability of national personnel. **International missions therefore tend to improve public action in the national territory, especially in sectors where senior officials liaise little with international bodies or similar services in other countries.**

In the case of the police and civil protection services, the participation of their personnel in multinational operations serves as effective training for carrying out internal security tasks or for mitigating the effects of any crisis situation that may crop up in the home territory. But in other areas such as health, education, migration management, the protection of human rights or security sector reform, the national personnel drafted onto international missions gain access to new ideas and experiences that can also be fed back into their daily work at home. Furthermore, the mere possibility of forming part of a crisis management team for a brief time acts as a personal and professional incentive to those most open to innovation and the improvement of working methods.

43. A clear example of the benefits of helping to set up crisis management resources is the imminent creation of European rapid reaction teams made up by national experts to help out any Member State at times of high influxes of illegal immigrants or asylum seekers¹⁹. The sometimes dramatic situations we have recently witnessed on the borders of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla would have greatly benefited from the deployment of such teams, for it is in fact such situations that have prompted their creation. There is no doubt that the deployment of these European teams where necessary would reinforce Spain's response capability and help it to ensure that border control and the reception of immigrants can be carried out without jeopardising human rights. It would also serve as a spur to efforts being made to modernise this response capability in the various fields of action.
44. **In Spain's case the modernisation from the creation of new international crisis management resources would not necessarily entail any further use of funds.** In accordance with the government's commitment of building up Spain's ODA to 0.5% by the end of the present legislature –the Monterrey Summit laid down the commitment of building up the ODA to 0.33% of GDP by 2006 – these funds will have to reach the figure of 3 billion euros in the present year and about 4.5 billion euros by 2008²⁰. **The creation and deployment of civilian crisis management resources could be financed as part of this sharp ODA increase, already pledged.** Furthermore, the criteria of the activities that can be charged to the ODA are being broadened to take in aspects bound up with security reform and conflict solving and prevention. At the behest of the Dutch government, the OECD has added six new activities to the list of those eligible for financing with these funds: democratic control and supervision of security expenditure, enhancing civil society's role in the security sector, support for laws and measures to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, improving the governability of the security sector and promoting civilian activities in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and solving and the fight against the proliferation of small arms. **Finally, it should be remembered that all ministerial departments have training funds, a suitable part of which could also be spent on the induction training of teams for international deployment.**
45. The creation of civilian resources for the management of international crises also allows funding possibilities to be harnessed within the EU, at least in the initial deployment stage. In 2001 the EU Council set up a financing mechanism taking in the rapid deployment of civilian crisis management resources called the Rapid Reaction Mechanism or RRM for short; its 2006 budget is 30 million euros. The RRM may be triggered for financing the initial deployment of civilian international crisis management resources on the condition that cases occur "in situations of

crisis or emerging crisis, situations posing a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilise the country”, where such situations are likely to jeopardise the beneficial effects of assistance and cooperation policies and programmes, their effectiveness and/or conditions for their proper implementation²¹. The RRM is implemented for a six-month period following the identification of one of the crises as defined above. Its aim is to establish bridges with other financial mechanisms more cumbersome in assigning and paying out funds and therefore unsuitable for tackling the emergency phase of any crisis. In its five years of operation the RRM has financed operations in fields and places as far apart as the development of the civil society in Bolivia or media backup in Afghanistan.

46. **The endeavours to create and strengthen civilian resources for the management of international crises would have widespread grassroots support in Spain, especially among the young.** Government action in favour of international solidarity is always very well regarded in Spain. In the case of the army, its participation in peace operations has greatly helped to vindicate it in the eyes of the public and even to bring it fully within the constitutional fold. The moment might now be ripe for extending Spain’s crisis management endeavours to the civilian aspects, thus helping to round out the efforts made by the international organisations Spain belongs to, especially the EU, doing so along the lines of the reforms undertaken by some of the most developed countries in the world.

Notas:

- ¹ The report *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, drawn up by a group of international experts and academics led by Narcís Serra, was presented to the High Representative of the European Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, on 15 September 2004. The report defines human security as the protection of persons from the consequences of grave and massive violations of human rights (See the text on http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/solana/040915CapBar.pdf, consulted on 22 January 2006).
- ² UK Presidency Seminar on Civilian-Military Coordination, Opening Address. London, 17 October 2005 ; CFSP Press Release S336/05, p. 1 and 2 (see document in http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/86615.pdf; (our italics).
- ³ See *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*. Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 1 (complete text on <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIIES.pdf>)
- ⁴ The Headline Goal 2003 aimed to endow the EU with the capability of deploying up to 60,000 personnel within 60 days and to sustain that deployment for at least one year (Rapid Reaction Force) and with a catalogue of the military capabilities required for that purpose. This Goal was revised in late 2004, resulting in the Headline Goal 2010, which enshrines the States' commitment to build up the necessary resources for responding to all crisis management operations provided for in the European Union Treaty –*Petersburg Tasks* – as well as those mentioned in the European Security Strategy – joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in the fight against terrorism and security sector reform. The three mainstay concepts of the 2010 Headline goal are interoperability, deployability and sustainability.
- ⁵ Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 11.
- ⁶ *Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference - Ministerial Declaration* (Brussels, 22 November 2004), paragraphs 3 and 4.
- ⁷ On 30 November the European Commission adopted its document COM (2005) 621 final, *Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court*, endorsed by the Brussels European Council by means of a recapitulation of its main proposals in Annex I of the Presidency Conclusions under the title *Global Approach to Immigration: Priority actions focussing on Africa and the Mediterranean*, which provides for the creation of these teams (p. 10). For more information on the informal meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Vienna, see: http://es.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-01-13T133537Z_01_PAN349125_RTRIDST_0_OESTP-UE-INMIGRACION.XML, consulted on 16 January 2006.
- ⁸ See *ad. ex. Determining an Approach for the External Dimension of the European Asylum Policy*. Working Document, Informal Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Luxembourg, 27-29 January 2005 (http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/01/2701docstravailinfojai/infojaifr1.pdf, consulted on 16 January 2006).
- ⁹ See paragraph 12 below.
- ¹⁰ See *Agreement between The European Union and The Kingdom of Norway establishing a Framework for the Participation of The Kingdom of Norway in The European Union Crisis Management Operations*, of 22 November 2004 (<http://odin.dep.no/europaportalen/english/speech/032191-290002/dok-bn!30005988.html>, consulted on 20 January 2006).
- ¹¹ Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years (See <http://www.un.org/spanish/peace/peacebuilding/questions.htm>, consulted on 10 January 2006).
- ¹² The concept was coined by the former Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Ghali, 10 years ago (See *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, ad. ex. para. 48).
- ¹³ *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group*. Geneva, May 2005, p. 3 (<http://ochaonline.un.org/GetBin.asp?DocID=3352>, consulted on 15 January 2006).
- ¹⁴ See “UN police strive for quality over quantity as role changes – top adviser”, in <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=17331&Cr=policy&Cr1=peacekeeping>, consulted on 30 January 2006.
- ¹⁵ The European Council of June 2004, held in Brussels, established these two arrangements in the document building on the *Joint Declaration on Cooperation between the EU and UN in the Field of Crisis Management, of September 2003, entitled EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations. Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration. Adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004)*.
- ¹⁶ See the table on page 27 below.
- ¹⁷ *2005 Annual Security Review Conference. Chair's Report*. Vienna, 21 and 22 June 2005, p. 22 (Doc. PC.DEL/814/05, of 1 August 2005; See text in http://www.osce.org/documents/cpc/2005/11/16814_en.pdf, consulted on 16 January 2006).
- ¹⁸ COESPU has now begun to operate in seven States of Africa and Asia (Cameroon, India, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco and Senegal), which have applied to participate in the training programme (*ibid.* p. 17 and 18).
- ¹⁹ See paragraph 8 above.
- ²⁰ See Silvia Hidalgo and Fernando Espada: *Hacia una nueva cooperación española*. FRIDE, Policy Papers, n. 2, December 2004, p. 3 and 4.
- ²¹ Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, OJ Series L 57/5, of 27 February 2001, article 3.

The Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) seeks to contribute to the prevention and resolution of violent or potentially violent international or intra-national conflicts and to the consolidation of peace, within a framework of respect and promotion of Human Rights and democratic values. Thus, the CITpax contributes to the establishment of cooperation pathways and communication channels between the parties involved, governments, NGO's and representatives of all sectors in the civil society.

ACTION PATHWAYS

In order to achieve its objectives, the CITpax employs various tools specially designed for each particular situation, including the following:

- **Second Track Diplomacy**, through the direct facilitation in negotiation processes between relevant political and economic actors, in conflicts where a dialogue pathway becomes necessary to complement or break the deadlock in the official track.

- **Multi-Track Diplomacy and Dialogue Facilitation**, through the creation of dialogue platforms among scholars, experts, activists, local authorities and governing bodies, as well as assisting the development of peace-building capacities in conflict areas.

- **Field Projects**, aimed at improving the capacities for conflict prevention and resolution through confidence-building, research and advocacy of feasible peace policies.

- **Research and Policy Development** of peace-related issues.

- **Professional Development and Training**, seeking to enhance the capacities of practitioners from different institutions working on peace-related issues.

- **Public Awareness and Advocacy**, through information dissemination, policy-oriented publishing and participation in the public debate.

PROGRAMMES

Notwithstanding a progressive extension of its working field to other areas, such as Southeast Europe, the CITpax current activities and projects are divided into three main programmes: two geographical programmes, one centred on Africa and the Middle East, and the other on Latin America, and the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, which thematically complements and supports the regional programmes.

Africa and the Middle East Programme

CITpax is involved in the following activities in Africa and the Middle East. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, CITpax is exploring Track II diplomatic tools to enhance ongoing negotiations and the status of the peace process. The Programme also

intends to progressively address some of the core challenges of the region such as peace perspectives between Syria and Israel and the conditions for the establishment of a cooperation and security system in the Middle East. Addressing regional conflicts, discreet efforts are being made to bring regional parties to explore venues for strengthening local peaceful resolutions. Focusing on the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and the enhancement of civil society in several countries in the Middle East, CITpax is also engaged in the North Africa context, with an emphasis on the Western Sahara conflict and the future of economic integration in the Maghreb.

Areas of the Programme:

- Regional Stability in the Middle East
- Emphasis on the Palestinian Israeli conflict
- Economic Integration of the Maghreb
- Transition to democracy

Latin America Programme

CITpax activities in this area include second track diplomacy aimed at bringing together conflicting parties; the promotion of dialogue to build up consensus; field missions for the identification of problematic issues in tense areas and political research on questions that could have a negative effect on democracy in Latin America. In particular, the programme focuses on the Andean Region with an initial emphasis on Colombia. It promotes confidence building initiatives and facilitates better understanding of the main issues related to the conflict in Colombia. Moreover, the CITpax examines past regional experiences in order to draw practical lessons to promote initiatives that pursue political dialogue and conflict prevention.

Areas of the Programme:

- Political regional dialogue
- Institutional stability in the Andean Region
- Alternatives to the Colombian conflict
- Promotion of "benign borders"

Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme

The programme concentrates on the study and support of negotiation processes and peace agreements, as well as on the facilitation and elaboration of recommendations to those countries going through post-conflict situations. CITpax's activities, which are based on the idea of human security, fall within a long-term global perspective. Thus, the projects designed within this programme intend to contribute to building and consolidating peace in those contexts where violence has been formally overcome.

It also aims at formulating strategies that may prevent potential conflicts by trying to address the causes and by proposing solutions for their symptoms. The programme will also study and analyse multinational peacekeeping interventions and work to improve the tools for training those professionals that participate in peace operations. This includes UN Peacekeeping Operations as well as other multilateral interventions that result in regime change and/or post-conflict reconstruction focusing on both civil-military relations and the civil roles conducted by military personnel.

Areas of the Programme:

- International civil administration
- Rule of law, institution-building and strengthening of democracy
- Transitional justice
- Humanitarian assistance
- Electoral processes
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
- Strengthening of civil society and support for the most vulnerable sectors
- Early responses to crisis situations
- Socioeconomic dimension of conflicts
- Regional dimension of conflicts
- Development Cooperation as an instrument for conflict prevention and peace-building

STAFF

Director-General: Emilio Cassinello, Ambassador of Spain.

Blanca Antonini, Director, Latin America Programme.

George E. Irani, Director, Africa and the Middle East Programme.

Claudia Medina, Director of Projects and Operations - Researcher.

Juan Garrigues, Desk Officer, Latin America Programme.

Stuart Reigeluth, Desk Officer, Africa and the Middle East Programme.

Gabriel Reyes, Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme.

ADVISORY COUNCIL

Emma Bonino, Member of the European Parliament.

Kim Campbell, Secretary-General of the Club of Madrid, former Prime Minister of Canada.

Baltasar Garzón, Judge of the National Audience, Spain.

Marrack Goulding, Dean, St Anthony's College, Oxford University.

Rosario Green, former Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Bernard Kouchner, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo.

Juan Manuel Santos, former Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Colombia.

Pierre Schori, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Cote d'Ivoire.

Francesc Vendrell, Special Representative of the UE for Afghanistan.

Federico Mayor Zaragoza, former Director-General of the UNESCO.

Trustees:



Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Toledo



Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
José María Barreda, President, Regional Government of Castilla-La Mancha
José Manuel Molina, Mayor of Toledo

Shlomo Ben-Ami, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Israel
Antonio Garrigues Walker, President, Fundación José Ortega y Gasset
Diego Hidalgo Schnur, President, FRIDE
Gregorio Marañón, President, Real Fundación de Toledo
Nabil Shaath, Deputy Prime Minister, Palestinian National Authority
Carlos Westendorp, Spanish Ambassador to the United States

Corporate Advisory Council:

Strategic Partners:



Project Partners:

